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INTRODUCTION 
To even the casual visitor the differences among the Central American 
Republics are striking. Indeed, it would be difficult to find three political 
systems anywhere in the world that differ among themselves as much as do those of 
contemporary Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The first is a military 
dictatorship of relentless ferocity and medieval barbarism (Aguilera, 1982; 
Aguilera and Romero, 1981; Americas Watch, 1983; Amnesty International, 1981; 
Torres-Rivas, 1980); the second, a revolutionary regime evolving to some as yet 
undefined version of socialism (Black, 1981; Carl, 1984; Collins, 1982; Gorman, 
1981; Nolan, 1984; Vargas, 1985); the third, a tropical welfare state with one of 
the few genuinely democratic political systems in Latin America (Bell, 1971; 
Rosenberg, 1983; Seligson, 1980; Torres-Rivas, 1975; Vega, 1981, 1982). These 
differences are even more surprising when one considers the many characteristics 
shared by all Central American Republics: a common Hispanic culture, a common 
religion, a common colonial history, and involvement in common political 
struggles as late as 1855. All of the five principal Central American Republics 
(Costa Rica , Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador) were part of the 
colonial Captaincy General of Guatemala, all participated in the ill fated empire 
of ~ u ~ u s t f n  Iturbide, all were involved in the Central American Federation and 
other nineteenth century attempts at union, all united to defeat William Walker 
and his filibusters (MacLeod, 1973; Woodward, 1985; Wortman, 1982). All share a 
common Isthmian location which has facilitated domination by outside 
powers-first Spain, then Great Britain and Germany, and finally, the United 
States. All are small peripheral export economies which have depended since 
colonial times on the export of one or two agricultural commodities and in four 
of the five countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador) one 
agricultural export, coffee, dominated their economies from the last half of the 
nineteenth century until approximately 1950 (Cardoso, 1975; Torres-Rivas, 1971). 
With the exception of Honduras where bananas, not coffee, ruled until after World 
War I1 (Morris and Ropp, 1977; Posas, 1981), the political economy of Central 
America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is largely the 
political economy of coffee cultivation and export. 
Despite these similarities, differences among the Central American Republics 
were apparent by 1821 (Torres-Rivas 1975:9) and, to a lesser extent, as early as 
1650 (MacLeod, 1973:307). In each of the four principal exporting countries, 
coffee developed in ways which both reflected and accentuated the varying 
political and economic structures inherited from the colonial past. These 
countries faced the revolutidnary crisis of the 1970s and 1980s with political 
systems dominated by traditional oligarchies whose wealth derived, to a greater 
or a lesser extent, from coffee cultivation, processing, and export. It was not 
coffee alone which created the tensions which led to revolution but it was coffee 
which created the political structures with which the Central American Republics, 
with varying degrees of success, tried to cope with revolution. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to trace the historical development of individual Central 
American coffee export economies even though the rapid accumulation of research 
findings on Costa Rica (Cardoso, 1977; Hall, 1978, 1980; Seligson 1975, 1980; 
Stone, 1982), Guatemala (Biechler, 1970; Cambranes, 1980., 1982; Dominguez, 1970; 
McCreery, 1976, 1980; Montenegro, 1976; Mosk, 1955; ~areez, 1961, 1970), El 
Salvador (Aubey, 1968-1969; Browning, 1971; Colindres, 1976, 1977; Kerr, 1977; 
Menjivar, 1980; Trujillo, 1981) and even poorly documented Nicaragua (Delgado, 
1961; Gariazzo et al. 1983a, 1983b; Keith, 1974; Radell, 1964; Wheelock, 1980) 
makes such a review overdue. Instead, the Central American coffee export 
economies will be examined as they existed at the midpoint of the twentieth 
century just prior to the economic transformations which would create the 
precond i t i ons  f o r  t h e  contemporary c r i s i s .  The goa l  i s  no t  t o  account f o r  t h e  
o r i g i n s  of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c r i s i s  i t s e l f  bu t  t o  account f o r  t h e  d i f f e r i n g  
responses  of t h e  c o f f e e  e l i t e s  of Costa Rica ,  Guatemala, Nicaragua, and E l  
Salvador  t o  t h e  cha l lenge  posed by growing demands f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power from 
below. I n  Costa Rica,  t h e  c o f f e e  e l i t e  was swept a s i d e  wi th  s u r p r i s i n g  ease  and 
p o l i t i c a l  power passed t o  new s o c i a l  groups i n  a  democrat ic  p o l i t i c a l  o rde r  
( B e l l ,  1971; Stone,  1980, Se l ig son ,  1980). I n  E l  Salvador t h e  c o f f e e  o l i ga rchy  
c l i n g s  t o  power wi th  ex t ens ive  American a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h e  f a c e  of a  vigorous and 
long entrenched r evo lu t iona ry  movement (Baloyra,  1982; Dunkerly, 1982; 
Montgomery, 1982). I n  Nicaragua, a popular revolution swept t o  power wi th  t h e  
a s s e n t  and even t h e  a c t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  of some members of t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e  
(Black, 1981; G i l l y ,  1980; Lopez e t  a l . ,  1980),  and i n  Guatemala, t h e  co f f ee  
o l i ga rchy  and t h e i r  a l l i e s  i n  bus iness  and t h e  m i l i t a r y  have imposed a  
counter - revolu t ionary  government on a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s o c i e t y  (Agui le ra ,  1982; 
Agui le ra  and Romero, 1981; Jonas and Tobis ,  1974). It i s  t h e  con ten t ion  of t h i s  
paper t h a t  t he se  d i f f e r i n g  e l i t e  responses  can ,  i n  l a r g e  p a r t ,  be accounted f o r  
by d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of c o f f e e  product ion i n  each count ry  and t h a t  
t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  o rgan iza t ion ,  i n  t u r n ,  shaped t h e  c l a s s  base of t he  e l i t e ,  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e i r  lower c l a s s  opponents,  and t h e  terms of t h e  c o n f l i c t  
between them. The Cen t r a l  American c o f f e e  o l i g a r c h s  developed t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  i n  
p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  systems which were a l r e a d y  d i s t i n c t .  The s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  
fundamental problems of land  t enu re ,  p roduct ion ,  l a b o r  r ec ru i tmen t ,  p rocess ing ,  
and expor t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  each e l i t e  were, t h e r e f o r e ,  d i f f e r e n t  and t h e  na tu re  of 
t h e i r  s o l u t i o n s  s e t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of economic and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  f o r  more than a  
cen tu ry  a f t e r  t h e  rise of t h e  c o f f e e  expor t  economies. The c o f f e e  growers 
a s s o c i a t i o n s  formed by members of t h e s e  e l i t e s  o r  t h e  governments they c o n t r o l l e d  
- 
also left behind detailed statistical portraits of their industries and it is 
this statistical record that forms the basis of the comparative analysis of the 
Central American coffee economies which follows. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION 
Each of the Central American coffee elites had to solve four fundamental 
problems common to coffee production everywhere: (1) acquisition and control over 
land, (2) organization and rationalization of production, (3) mechanization and 
finance of processing, and (4) finance and control over exports. Transport, 
roasting, soluble coffee manufacture, distribution, and retail sales were always 
controlled by agents of the importing nations (Fischer, 1972:50-51; Wickizer, 
1943:55-56; Sivetz and Foote, Vol. 2:279) but the first four steps involved 
varying degrees of participation by Central American nationals or by European 
immigrants taking up permanent residence in the region. Control over land, 
production, processing, exports, or over some combination of these steps provided 
Central American coffee growers, both immigrant and national, with important 
sources of wealth and political power. Nevertheless, Central American coffee 
growers differed considerably among themselves in their ability to solve problems 
of land, production, processing, and export, in the nature of the solutions they 
adopted and in the effect of their solutions on their ultimate political 
positions. To understand both the economic and political behavior of the Central 
Gerican coffee elite requires some understanding of the problems facing them at 
each stage of the coffee production process. 
Land 
Control over land is not only an obvious prerequisite for any kind of 
agricultural activity including the production of coffee, but it also can be in 
itself an important source of power and wealth. Posession of an estate in 
Central America even now, but more so in the recent past, implied possession of 
seignorial rights over the rural population resident on or near the estate and, 
as a result, almost complete control of this population's political allegiance 
(Pansini, 1977:18-21; Stone, 1982:109-110; Wheelock, 1980:33). This kind of 
social and political power exists even if no coffee is grown and even 
inefficient, unprofitable producers may be politically influential through their 
control over labor or voting blocs. Possession of land has, in turn, always 
depended more on access to political than to economic power. Privileged Central 
Americans and European'immigrants used this power to acquire coffee lands, and 
coffee wealth to acquire political power. State power was used by the Central 
American coffee elites to expropriate the extensive lands held by the Church and 
indigenous communities in Guatemala (Cambranes, 1982:18; McCreery, 1976:456-457; 
Torres-Rivas, 1975:48-49); by indigenous communities and municipal governments in 
El Salvador (Browning, 1971:174-175; Kerr, 1977:7; Menjivar, 1980:86-87;); by 
indigenous communities and the national government in Nicaragua (Delgado, 
1961:38; Wheelock, 1981:109); and by the national government in Costa Rica (Hall, 
1982:34-35; Stone, 1980:99). Even in Costa Rica where the colonial heritage was 
weakest, two-thirds of the major nineteenth century coffee growers were 
descendents of only - two colonial families (Stone, 1980: 191 ). In Guatemala much 
coffee production passed rapidly into the hands of German immigrants who enjoyed 
preferedtial citizenship rights and official favor (~axez, 1970: 19-20, 23-25). 
In El Salvador privileged urban groups, and government officials became the first 
planters and were quickly joined by European immigrants attracted by the coffee 
boom (Browning, 1971:168-169; Menjivar, 1980:129,131). In Nicaragua the coffee 
estate evolved form the colonial hacienda and Europeans and North Americans were 
granted extensive concessions (Delgado, 1961:38; Niederlein, 1898:51-52; 
Wheelock, 1980:32). The consolidation of control over coffee lands formed an 
enduring base of political power for the coffee elites throughout Central America 
although the amount of land and the strength of seignorial control varied 
considerably among the four major coffee producing nations. The Central American 
coffee elites also varied considerably in their ability to convert control over 
land and people into agricultural wealth through the rationalization of the next 
stage in the coffee cycle - production. 
Production 
Land secured, the Central American planters devoted themselves tb coffee 
production with varying degrees of technical sophistication and productivity. 
All Central American planters were confronted with the fact that coffee 
production (as opposed to processing.) admits of little or no mechanization in 
cultivation and none whatsoever in harvesting. El Salvadoran planter J. Hill's 
observation in the 1930s that the maximum number of coffee beans harvested per 
worker per day could not exceed approximately 40,000 (Hill, 1936:424) is as true 
today as it was in 1930, or for that matter, in 1830. Attempts to mechanize the 
harvest process, notably in Brazil (Holloway, 1974: 61) have never met with much 
success and machinery is even more difficult to use in the rugged terrain of 
Central American coffee farms. Furthermore, in every Central American producing 
country except Nicaragua coffee beans are now, and always have been, picked with 
the utmost care one bean at a time to protect the quality of the fine washed 
"milds" produced in the region (Duque, 1938:41-45; Sivetz and Foote, 1963, Vol 
1:50; Wellman, 1961:365-366; Jamaica Coffee Industry Board, 1959:17). Since the 
peak harvest period in' Central America tends to be short (a month or less) 
planters experience an acute need for massive amounts of hand labor at a critical 
point in the production cycle. Cultivation, weeding, and pruning also are not 
mechanized although chemical herbicides and unshaded, tightly spaced plantings 
have begun to reduce the demand for labor in the preharvest period (Jamaican 
Coffee Board, 1958:7-11; Wellman, 1961:198-200). The limited prospects for 
mechanization and the corresponding need for hand labor, particularly at harvest, 
committed Central American planters to a continuous search for large pools of 
cheap labor and severely limited their ability to substitute capital for labor in 
the production process itself. Paradoxically, this worked- to the advantage of 
Central American nationals since it lowered capital requirements for entry in the 
industry and made it possible for Central Americans with land or political- - 
.-- 
influence, but little cash, to rise to positions of prominence in coffee 
/ 
I 
production. . . 
~ Although capital could not be profitably invested in machinery, productivity 
~ could and was vastly increased in some areas by investment in the condition of 
I the coffee trees themselves. Productivity per unit area or per bearing tree can 
be increased substantially by planting newer and higher yielding varieties such 
as Bourbon in the 1940s and 1950s and Caturra today; by increasing the density of 
plantings, by making use of organic or chemical fertilizers; by planting nitrogen 
I fixing plants; by using chemical weed killers; by the application of pesticides 
I ' and fungicides; and' by careful pruning to maximize yield and minimize effort 
during harvest (Sivetz and Foote, 1963, Vol. I:30-37; Wellman, 1961:191-351; 
Dominguez, 1970:134-196). Since the difference between high and low yielding 
varieties, fertilized and unfertilized fields, or pruned and unpruned trees can 
be as much as 50 percent for. each innovation, the cdmbined effect on yields can 
be substantial. Since denser, higher yielding groves are easier to harvest, 
there are likely to be savings at harvest as well as during cultivation and 
weeding. Furthermore, the more attention devoted to scientific cultivation 
practices the healthier the plants, and the less the need to expend labor on 
replanting diseased groves or fighting epidemics of plant blight or insect 
infestation. Since the coffee plant is subject to a remarkable variety of 
diseases, this is an important cost consideration for a planter. The net effect 
of these innovations is to substantially increase both the productivity of the 
land per unit area and the productivity of labor per unit weight of coffee 
harvested. Although capital cannot be profitably invested in machinery, it can 
be profitably invested in a standing tree crop with a productive life time of 
approximately five to twenty-five years.. In the case of coffee cultivation, 
capital literally grows on trees. 
Given the substantial gains in both productivity and profitability which can 
be realized through scientific cultivation, a technological imperative of 
considerable force drives planters in the direction of capital intensive 
rationalized production. This has, in fact, been the outcome unless, as has 
frequently been the case in Central America, political or social factors have 
blocked rationalization of the industry. To the degree that capital is invested 
in scientifically managed coffee groves, the planter becomes more and more an 
agrarian capitalist and less and less a seignorial land owner. The returns on 
this invested capital or the principal itself can be used to expand production or 
to diversify into other agricultural sectors or into finance or industry. 
Financial power can, of course, be translated into political power so that the 
successful scientific coffee grower gains an additional source of influence 
beyond that granted by ownership of the land itself and control over the people 
who live on it. But the power is different in substance and the political goals 
of a nascent class of agrarian capitalists are not likely to be identical to 
those of a traditional seignorial elite with little disposable capital other than 
the land itself. As one moves downstream in production sequence to processing 
and export, agrarian capital gradually changes into industrial and financial 
capital, respectively, and the economic base of the coffee elite, as well as 
their economic interests, correspondingly shift. 
Processing 
Under Central American conditions, processing, unlike production, can be 
extensively mechanized and therefore the capital requirements are considerably 
greater in processing than in production. Furthermore, fully rationalized 
processing requires an elaborate physical plant so that the capital is less 
agrarian than industrial. Harvested coffee beans begin to ferment almost 
immediately and if the crop is not to be lost, it must be processed within 8 to 
36 hours after picking (Sivetz and Foote, 1963:54; Wellman, 1961:370). Whatever 
form the processing takes, it must remove the seeds of the coffee berry - the 
source of coffee as a beverage -- from the surrounding organic material. Each 
coffee berry consists of an outer skin surrounding a thick pulp which constitutes 
the greater part of the mass of the berry. Surrounding the seeds are a thick, 
sticky substance known as mucilage, a paper like membrane called the parchment, 
and a thin coating called the silver skin. In Central America, the unprocessed 
berries are usually referred to as "cherries" .(cereza) and coffee in this state 
is said to be "en cereza." The parchment membrane is called "pergamino" and 
partially processed coffee with the skin pulp and mucilage removed is said to be 
I1 en pergamino." Threshed beans with parchment and silver skin removed ("green" 
coffee in English) are referred to by the Spanish word for gold, "oro." -
Processing must dispose of the skin and pulp, separate the mucilage from the 
parchment, and strip off the parchment and silver skin without contaminating or 
damaging the beans themselves. Since the dry green coffee bean is relatively 
f r a g i l e  and h a s  an  a c t i v e  a f f i n i t y  f o r  a v a r i e t y  of contaminants,  p rocess ing  can 
be complex. 
I n  gene ra l ,  two major approaches have evolved t o  so lve  t h e  problem of 
removing t h e  bean from t h e  be r ry  and i n  t h e  c o f f e e  t r a d e  t h e s e  approaches a r e  
c a l l e d  "dry" and "wet" process ing  (S ive t z  and Foote ,  1963:55-57; Wellman, 
1961:370-374; Wickizer,  1943:41-45). I n  t h e  d r y  method, c o f f e e  may be processed 
without  e l a b o r a t e  machinery simply by dry ing  t h e  harves ted  b e r r i e s  on an open 
p a t i o  o r  even on hard ,  d ry  ground and then  t h r e s h i n g  t h e  hardened f r u i t .  The 
th r e sh ing  can be done wi th  a technology a s  s imple  a s  d r i v i n g  c a t t l e  ac ros s  t h e  
dry  ground o r  pounding t h e  d r i e d  f r u i t  a g a i n s t  a hollow stump wi th  a s t i c k .  
Qual i ty  c o n t r o l  is ,  however, d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach i eve  w i t h  t h e  d ry  method and t h i s  
problem i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  acu t e  i n  moist  c l i m a t e s  such a s  t hose  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  most 
of t h e  C e n t r a l  American c o f f e e  zone. A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  product ion of h igh  q u a l i t y  
c o f f e e  i n  C e n t r a l  America depends on t h e  much more e l a b o r a t e  technology of wet 
p rocess ing .  I n  t h i s  system, t h e  o u t e r  s h e l l  and pulp  a r e  f i r s t  removed by 
mechanical means, and t h e  mucilage is  allowed t o  ferment  u n t i l  i t  can be washed 
away. The beans a r e  then  d r i e d  i n  open o r  by mechanical d r y e r s  and t h e  beans a r e  
mechanical ly  th reshed  t o  remove t h e  parchment and s i l v e r  s k i n  membrane. Although 
w e t  p rocess ing  can be c a r r i e d  ou t  through r e l a t i v e l y  s imple procedures such a s  
depulping t h e  beans by stamping on them b a r e f o o t  and removing t h e  mucilage by 
hand washing, cons ide rab l e  e f f i c i e n c i e s  can be gained by t h e  use of power d r iven  
machinery. The range of a p p l i c a b l e  technology is  cons iderab ly  g r e a t e r  i n  wet 
than  i n  d r y  process ing  and i n  Cen t r a l  America, p roces s ing  p l a n t s  have ranged from 
rudimentary hand d r iven  wooden devices  of l o c a l  manufacture (Kei th ,  1974:92; 
Radel l ,  1964:51-52) t o  e l a b o r a t e ,  power-driven i n d u s t r i a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
( I n s t i t u t o  Centroamericano de Administration de Empresas, 1981:6-11; Morrison and 
Norris, 1954:318-322). 
Since the capital requirements of a large, technologically sophisticated wet 
process plant are substantial and have been so since industrial processing 
technology was developed at the end of the nineteenth century, the owners of 
coffee processing plants (called "beneficios" in Spanish America) are industrial 
capitalists using an agricultural raw material rather than agriculturalists. It 
is, of course, entirely possible for a coffee producer to integrate downstream 
into processing and in fact many large producers in Central America have owned 
their own processing plants (Baloyra, 1982:25; Dominguez, 1970:264; Hall, 
1982:87; Radell, 1964:25). But whether or not the processing plant is owned by a 
producer, the capital requirements of this industrial technology imply not only a 
different but substantially larger base of economic power than that provided by 
coffee production alone. In addition, most coffee processors purchase additional 
coffee from other growers to realize economies of scale; this, in turn, may lead 
them to make advances to other growers and hence assume the role of banker. It 
is not uncommon in Central Americ'a for large processing plants to provide the 
capital for banks and production, processing, and banking activities often 
overlap in coffee production (Habib, 1958:138; Hall, 1982:45; Slutsky and Alonso, 
1971:21-22; Wheelock, 1980:144-145). Similarly, a processor possesses a fund of 
capital which may allow him to diversify into other agricultural activities or 
into industry, tourism, or real estate (Colindres, 1976:471; ~acez, 1970: 385-410; 
Stone, 1982:147-351). To the degree that a coffee elite is involved in 
processing, its economic base and political interests will tend to diverge 
further from those of a traditional land owning elite. 
Export 
Export is the stage of the coffee cycle which demanded the most capital and 
it is also the area where foreigners have had their greatest impact on the 
Central American industry. The exporter not only must purchase the crop in 
Central America and hold it until eventual sale to European or American importers 
but also must be part of an elaborate international trading and financial 
network. At this point, financial and mercantile considerations vastly outweigh 
purely agricultural concerns and although exporters may be involved in 
production, they are often principally financial intermediaries. Exporters may 
become involved in financing the entire coffee system through advances as, for 
example, occurred with English capital in Costa Rica (Hall, 1982:45-46) or German 
capital in Guatemala (Biechler, 1970:36). Nevertheless, throughout Central 
.America, many of the largest producers and processers did become involved in 
export and in El Salvador this 'pattern was particularly pronounced (Colindres, 
1976:471; ~ebastign, 1979: 950-951 ). Although in many cases production, 
processing, and export were often controlled by the same individuals or family 
groups, the differing financial and technical requirements of the export phase of 
the. coffee production cycle provide an additional base for differentiation of 
Central American coffee elites. 
Moving downstream from' the point of production to the point of sale through 
control over land, production, processing, . and export, capital requirements, 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills, prospects for diversification, and 
association with purely financial activities all change markedly. The industrial 
and financial capital and skills required in the downstream stages have given 
Europeans and North Americans a distinct advantage in export and, to a lesser 
extent, processing while Central American nationals have used their better 
political connections to gain control over land and production. In Guatemala, 
for example, by the 1930s, although German growers controlled only 25 percent of 
the plantations, they accounted for almost two-thirds of production and an even 
larger percentage of exports (Biechler, 1970:36-37). As Biechler (Ibid.:36) 
notes, "To a significant extent, coffee ceased to be a national. activity." In 
Nicaragua, all coffee exports were controlled by a subsidiary of two American 
banking houses allied with the Nicaraguan national bank and it was not until the . 
1950s that Nicaraguan nationals had any direct role in exports (Wheelock, 
1980:144). In Costa Rica, foreigners exercised relatively little direct control 
over production but as late as 1935 almost a third of the processors in Costa 
Rica were either foreigners or descendents of immigrants who arrived in Costa 
Rica after 1840 and these grand processors, many of whom were also exporters, 
controlled 44 percent of the national harvest (Hall, 1982:53). Even in El 
Salvador where national capital was strongest, international trading firms such 
as Cura ao (Dutch) or Nottlebohm (German) controlled a major portion of exports f 
(~sociacign Cafetalera, 1940: 192-199). Nevertheless, the relativeli low capital 
requirements for entry into at least the production phase of the coffee cycle 
provided Central Americans with a source of national wealth and a possible point 
of entry into processing and export. But the coffee elites of Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador differed markedly in their ability to 
exploit the opportunities provided by coffee and in their relative dominance over 
each phase of the coffee production sequence. These differences at each state - 
land acquisition, production,- processing, and export -- are clearly evident in 
the detailed statistical record accumulated by coffee growers and their 
governments. This statistical record provides us not only with a portrait of the 
differences among the four coffee systems but also reveals important differences 
in the economic base of each of the ruling coffee elites in the early twentieth 
century. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the coffee production sequence suggests two very different bases 
of political power for Central American coffee elites. Control over land and 
tight seignorial restrictions over people resident on it provide a source of 
military or political influence, but may or may not be associated with great 
financial or industrial power. Control over production, processing, and export, 
on the .other hand, insures some degree of industrial or financial power but does 
not.guarantee the control over land and people which has been the traditional 
base of oligarchic dominance throughout Latin America. In fact, to the degree 
that rationalized coffee cultivation requires clearing resident workers from the 
subsistence plots and substituting wage for bound labor, the two forms of power 
may not be entirely compatible. Although in Central America the two ' bases of 
power can be and have been combined, the coffee elites differ sufficiently among 
themselves in their dependence on either control over land, coffee, and people or 
control over production technology, processing, and export, to require the 
consideration of each potential base of elite power separately. 
Control over Land, Coffee, and People 
There is little disagreement among authors writing about Guatemala 
(Biechler, 1970: 109, Cambranes, 1982: 19; Montenegro, 1976: 144; ~axez, 1970: 81) or 
0 in official statistical sources (Guatemala, ~ireccio'n General de Estadlstica, 
1953:5, 1971:245,248) about the absolute domination of Guatemalan coffee land and 
production by large estates. Similarly, there is little disagreement about the 
domination of a planter oligarchy over land and production in El Salvador 
(Browning, 1971:179; Colindres, 1976:470-471; ~ebastign, 1979:950-951) although 
comparative anlalysis of the substantial differences between the two systems has 
received less attention (Cardoso, 1975; Torres-Rivas, 1971). There is, however, 
cons ide rab l e  deba te  about  t h e  t r u e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of land and product ion and t h e  
r e l a t i v e  s i z e  and importance of t h e  l a r g e  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  ca se  of both Costa Rica 
. and Nicaragua. For Costa Rica ,  t h e  opposing p o s i t i o n s  a r e  most f o r c e f u l l y  s t a t e d  
by Carolyn Ha l l  (1982) and Mi t che l l  Se l igson  (1975, 1980) a l though Ha l l ' s  
p o s i t i o n  has  been argued by Cardoso (1977) and Torres-Rivas (1975) and Se l igson ' s  
work b u i l d s  on t h a t  of Moretzsohn de Andrade (1967). H a l l  argued t h a t  Costa 
Rican c o f f e e  land ownership and product ion have been dominated by smal l  ho lde r s  
and t h a t  e s t a t e  product ion  is  of less r e l a t i v e  importance and t h e  e s t a t e s  
. themselves,  smal le r  than elsewhere i n  C e n t r a l  America. Se l igson  contends t h a t  
t h e  r i s e  of co f f ee  product ion transformed t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  sma l l  ho ld ing  p a t t e r n  
of Costa Rican a g r i c u l t u r e  and l e d  t o  dominance by l a rge '  e s t a t e s ,  unequal l and  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  and t h e  growth of a  l a n d l e s s  p r o l e t a r i a t .  For Nicaragua, Jaime 
Wheelock i n  h i s  i n f l u e n t i a l  work, Imperial ismo y Dictadura (1980), a rgues  t h a t  
t h e  Nicaraguan c o f f e e  e s t a t e  was simply an  'extension of p a t t e r n s  of c o l o n i a l  
a g r i c u l t u r e  and t h a t  l a r g e  manorial  u n i t s  dominated c o f f e e  product ion.  I n  
Wheelock's view, Nicaragua d i f f e r s  from El  Salvador  i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  development 
of c o f f e e  product ion and process ing  but  n o t  i n  t h e  importance of t h e  l a r g e  
e s t a t e .  Baumeister (1982), on t h e  o t h e r  hand, has  proposed a  model of t h e  
Nicaraguan a g r a r i a n  economy which sugges t s  t h a t  Nicaragua, l i k e  Costa Rica ,  is  an 
except ion  t o  t h e  L a t i n  American p a t t e r n  of l a r g e  e s t a t e  dominance and t h a t  smal l  
ho lde r s  and what he c a l l s  a  bourgeois ie  "chapio l la"  o r  smal l  employer s t r a t a  were 
t h e  most important  f a c t o r s  i n  p re r evo lu t iona ry  Nicaraguan c o f f e e  product ion.  
The outcomes of both of t h e s e  deba tes  have imp l i ca t i ons  which go f a r  beyond 
t h e  c o f f e e  economy. I n  t h e  c a s e  of Costa Rica ,  t h e  prominence of smal l  ho lde r s  
has  long been seen a s  an important  suppor t  f o r  democracy ( B e l l ,  1971:6; Merz, 
1937:288; Torres-Rivas, 1975:70) and i n  Nicaragua, t h e  absence of a  c l a s s  of 
l a r g e  e s t a t e  owners i n  c o f f e e  should weaken r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
program of t h e  S a n d i n i s t a s  (Baumeister,  1982:48). A s  i s  o f t e n  t h e  c a s e  i n  such 
deba tes ,  t h e r e  i s  more t han  a  l i t t l e  t r u t h  i n  both p o s i t i o n s  and i n  p a r t  t h e  
cont inued d i s c u s s i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h e  more v a r i e d  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of co f f ee  
product ion i n  Costa Rica and Nicaragua a s  opposed t o  Guatemala and E l  Salvador.  
I n  a l l  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s ,  however, an  a c c u r a t e  assessment of t h e  t r u e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of l and  and product ion  r e q u i r e s  a  c o n s i s t e n t  and s o c i o l o g i c a l l y  meaningful 
d e f i n i t i o n  of e s t a t e  and smal l  ho lder  product ion.  A s  Gariazzo e t  a l .  (1983b:22) 
have pointed o u t ,  sma l l  ho ld ing  and e s t a t e  product ion a r e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  c l a s s  
c a t e g o r i e s  no t  s imply s i z e  of ho ld ing  i n t e r v a l s .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s i z e  
of c o f f e e  ho ld ing  and c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  i s  complex and depends on t h e  i n t e n s i t y ,  
t e c h n i c a l  development, and s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ion  of product ion.  Given t h e  h igh  
va lue  and l a b o r  i n t e n s i v i t y  of t h e  crop,  even r e l a t i v e l y  small hold ings  can 
c r e a t e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  c l a s s  d i v i s i o n  between t h e  dominant l and  owners and t h e i r  
e s t a t e  and migrant h a r v e s t  l a b o r e r s .  Furthermore, t h e  c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  of a  c o f f e e  
grower i s  t i e d  more c l o s e l y  t o  t h e  a r e a  i n  co f f ee  than  t o  t h e  t o t a l  s i z e  of 
' hold ing  and t h e  l a t t e r  index  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  mis lead ing  when c o f f e e  
c u l t i v a t i o n  i s  combined w i t h  c a t t l e  r a i s i n g  o r  o t h e r  e x t e n s i v e  a g r i c u l t u r e .  
I n  o rde r  t o  provide  a  b a s i s  f o r  sy s t ema t i c  comparis ion among t h e  f o u r  major 
Cen t r a l  American c o f f e e  producers  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  dec ide  among t h e  competing images 
of c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  i n  Costa Rica and Nicaragua, i t  i s  necessary  t o  have both a  
d e f i n i t i o n  of c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  i n  c o f f e e  c u l t i v a t i o n  and a  me t r i c  def ined  i n  terms 
of c o f f e e  a r e a s  r epo r t ed  i n  Cen t r a l  American c o f f e e  censuses .  The system used 
he re  i s  based on those  developed by Ricardo F a l l a  f o r  r e s e a r c h  i n  t h e  Department 
of J i no t ega ,  Nicaragua (descr ibed  i n  Gariazzo e t  a l . ,  1983b:28) and by t h e  Centro 
de Inves t i gac iones  y Es tudios  de l a  Reforma Agrar ia  (n.d.) f o r  Nicaragua a s  a  
whole. Since the focus of this study is on elite composition, an additional 
distinction has been introduced to include important differences in the 
organization of estate production evident in the abundant descriptive literature 
on individual estates (Bratton, 1939; Cardoso, 1977; Comite Interamericano de 
Desarrollo Agricola, 1965; Gariazzo et al., 1983b; Hall, 1978; Instituto 
Centroamericano de Administracion de Empresas, 1977, 1981; Morrison and Norris, 
1954; ~aEez, 1970; Pansini, 1977; Villegas, 1965). 
Falla (Gariazzo et al., 1983b:28-29) distinguished three important types of 
producers in Jinotega: "agricultores fuertes" (strong farmers); "agricultores 
medianos" (medium farmers); and "campesinos ricos" (rich peasants). Strong 
producers controlled 50 to 100 manzanas (1 manzana = .69 hectare) of coffee, but 
did not themselves participate in production or management. Instead, they 
employed administrators who directed the activities of from 10 to 20 to sometimes 
as many as 60 permanent laborers as well as a much larger number of harvest 
workers. A medium farmer managed his estate directly and sometimes took part in 
specialized cultivating activities. He employed a smaller number of workers, the 
majority of them temporary, and controlled from 10 to 49 manzanas of coffee. The 
rich peasant had from 3 to less than 10 manzanas of coffee and worked the farm 
himself aided by family members and a few hired temporary laborers. The system 
developed by the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria 
(CIERA) in Nicaragua is similar to Falla's although the ranges of coffee area 
intervals are slightly different and, significantly, CIERA terms producers with 
more than 65 rnanzanas of coffee "latifundistas y gran burgesfal' (large land 
holders and grand bourgeoisie) rather than using Falla's "strong farmer" term for 
the corresponding category. CIERA also identified an additional "poor peasant " 
category ( 5  manzanas of coff.ee or less) which defines those cultivators too poor 
t o  suppor t  themselves s o l e l y  by c o f f e e  growing. Most "poor peasant"  c o f f e e  
c u l t i v a t o r s  a r e  fo rced  t o  s ea rch  f o r  o u t s i d e  employment o f t e n ,  a l though no t  
i n v a r i a b l y ,  on o t h e r ,  l a r g e r  c o f f e e  farms. The ca tegory  system f o r  smal le r  
growers adopted f o r  t h i s  s tudy  combines t h e  F a l l a  and CIERA systems and d e f i n e s  
t h e  fo l l owing  groups accord ing  t o  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n a l  c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  a s  measured by 
t h e  amount of c o f f e e  they  c o n t r o l :  sub-family fa rmers  who c o n t r o l  from 0 t o  4.9 
manzanas of c o f f e e  a r e  assumed t o  be t o o  poor t o  suppor t  themselves from t h e i r  
farms and can ,  t he re f  o r e ,  be thought  of a s  par t - t ime mini-farmers and part-t ime 
wage l a b o r e r s ;  fami ly  fa rmers  who c o n t r o l  from 5 t o  10 manzanas of co f f ee  a r e  
assumed t o  be a b l e  t o  suppor t  themselves i n  c o f f e e  c u l t i v a t i o n  l a r g e l y  through 
t h e i r  own and t h e i r  fami ly ' s  l abo r ;  sma l l  employers who c o n t r o l  from 10 t o  49.9 
manzanas a r e  assumed t o  r e l y  on permanent and h a r v e s t  wage l a b o r e r s  r a t h e r  than 
fami ly  members f o r  most l a b o r ,  t o  manage t h e i r  farms themselves,  and t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  some s p e c i a l i z e d  c u l t i v a t i o n  t a sks .  
It i s  apparen t  from both t h e  F a l l a  and CIERA d e f i n i t i o n s  and from s t u d i e s  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  e s t a t e s  t h a t  a producer wi th  from 50 t o  99.9 manzanas of co f f ee  who 
employes from 10 t o  a s  many a s  60 r e s i d e n t  l a b o r e r s  and perhaps a s  many a s  300 
h a r v e s t  l a b o r e r s  is ,  both f u n c t i o n a l l y  and s o c i a l l y ,  a member of t h e  a g r a r i a n  
upper c l a s s .  I n  a reg ion  of impoverished fami ly  fa rmers  and l a n d l e s s  l a b o r e r s ,  
t h e  owner of even such a seemingly modest e s t a t e  can be a p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  
power t o  be reckoned with.  An e s t a t e  s t u d i e d  by Gariazzo e t  a l .  (1983b:61-65) i n  
Diriamba, Nicaragua, f o r  example, had 80 manzanas of c o f f e e  and employed a year  
round l a b o r  f o r c e  of 2 r e s i d e n t  and 20 day l a b o r e r s  and a ha rves t  l abo r  f o r c e  of 
more than 80. The owner, a widow, l i v e d  i n  a s e i g n o r i a l ,  a l though somewhat 
d e c r e p i t ,  v i l l a  and h e r  c h i l d r e n  had a l l  managed t o  a t t a i n  managerial  o r  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  p o s i t i o n s  o u t s i d e  a g r i c u l t u r e .  She was a r e l a t i v e  by marriage of a 
19 
prominent member of t h e  p re revo lu t iona ry  o l i g a r c h y  who had been a  c l o s e  a s s o c i a t e  
of t h e  Somozas. Her l a t e  husband had been a  shareholder  i n  a  major Nicaraguan 
beer  b o t t l e r  and al though she  no longer  r ece ived  income from t h e  s h a r e s ,  i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  fami ly ' s  i n t e r e s t s  extended o u t s i d e  a g r i c u l t u r e .  S o c i a l l y  and 
p o l i t i c a l l y ,  h e r  f ami ly  was c l e a r l y  p a r t  of t h e  p re revo lu t iona ry  Nicaraguan 
a r i s t o c r a c y .  S imi l a r ly ,  t h e  owner of a  Costa Rican e s t a t e  of approximately t h e  
same s i z e  (75 manzanas i n  co f f ee ;  14 permanent; and 200 t o  300 h a r v e s t  workers) 
was a  13 th  genera t ion  descent  of t h e  conquis tador ,  Juan Vazquez de Coronado, 
owned s e v e r a l  o t h e r  e s t a t e s ,  a s  d id  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  members of h e r  family,  and 
.' maintained a  l i f e s t y l e  which could on ly  be c a l l e d  sumptuous. Both h e r  f a t h e r  and 
h e r  b ro the r  had he ld  i n f l u e n t i a l  p o s t s  i n  t h e  Costa Rican n a t i o n a l  government 
( In t e rv i ew  Curr idaba t ,  Costa Rica,  Feb. 1, 1984). A s  t h e s e  examples make c l e a r ,  
i n  both Nicaragua and Costa Rica,  .it is  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a  fami ly  t o  ach ieve  a  
p o s i t i o n  of n a t i o n a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  prominence wi th  a  c o f f e e  e s t a t e  much 
sma l l e r  than t h e  v a s t  c o f f e e  domains of Sao ~ a u l o  o r  t h e  sma l l e r  but  s t i l l  
s i z e a b l e  e s t a t e s  of Guatemala. I n  both examples t h e  owner o r  h e r  fami ly  owned 
a d d i t i o n a l  e s t a t e s  s o  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  economic base of both f a m i l i e s  is  
. . 
cons ide rab ly  broader  than  ownership of a  s i n g l e  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  50 t o  100 manzana 
range would sugges t .  Such concent ra ted  ownership is ,  however, t h e  r u l e ,  n o t  t h e  
except ion  i n  C e n t r a l  America s o  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  concen t r a t i on  of c o f f e e  land and 
product ion i s  much g r e a t e r  than t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  by s i z e  of i n d i v i d u a l  ho ld ings  
would i n d i c a t e .  Analysis  of t h e  d e t a i l e d  ownership l i s t i n g s  i n  t h e  1910 
Nicaraguan c o f f e e  cen.sus ( ~ e ~ g b l i c a  de Nicaragua, 1910) sugges ts  t h a t  mu l t i p l e  
ownership was common e s p e c i a l l y  among l a r g e  growers. The same p a t t e r n  is  found 
i n  Costa Rica (Ha l l ,  1982:53,86,110) and E l  Salvador  (Colindres ,  1976:471). 
Never the less ,  i t  is  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  few growers a t  t h i s  l e v e l  
c o n t r o l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e sou rces  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  from 
product ion t o  process ing  t o  expor t .  Nei ther  t h e  Nicaraguan nor  t h e  Costa Rican 
e s t a t e  descr ibed  above had i t s  own b e n e f i c i o  and n e i t h e r  e s t a t e  owner was 
d i r e c t l y  involved i n  expor t s .  I n  gene ra l ,  c o n t r o l  of l a r g e r  amounts of co f f ee  
land i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  both 'processing and ,export a c t i v i t y ;  sma l l e r  e s t a t e  
producers ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  prominence, t y p i c a l l y  l a c k  t h e  
r e sou rces  f o r  such a c t i v i t i e s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  an  a d d i t i o n a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  was made 
between e s t a t e  producers  who c o n t r o l  a  farm w i t h  between 50 and 99.9 manzanas i n  
: co f f ee  and i n t e g r a t e d  producers  who c o n t r o l  a  farm wi th  100 manzanas o r  more i n  
co f f ee .  An e s t a t e  producer  w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  employ an  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  t o  oversee t h e  
day t o  day ope ra t i ons  of t h e  e s t a t e  and t o  supe rv i se  t h e  work of a l a r g e  number 
of r e s i d e n t  and h a r v e s t  wage l abo re r s .  Although t h e  ownership of such an e s t a t e ,  
combined a s  it  f r e q u e n t l y  is  wi th  ownership of o t h e r  such e s t a t e s ,  provides  t h e  
owner wi th  an upper c l a s s  l i f e  s t y l e  and t h e  l e i s u r e  i n  which t o  en joy  i t ,  it 
will' n o t  t y p i c a l l y  be a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  process ing ,  expor t ,  o r  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  t h e  c o f f e e  i ndus t ry .  The owner of an e s t a t e  wi th  100 manzanas o r  more i n  
1 c o f f e e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  own h i s  own process ing  p l a n t ,  w i l l  
I 
o f t e n  c o n t r o l  an expor t i ng  f i rm ,  and w i l l  u s u a l l y  a l s o  own numerous o t h e r  l a r g e  
e s t a t e s .  He w i l l  a l s o  possess  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e sou rces  t o  d i v e r s i f y  in to .  o t h e r  
I 
I a g r i c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o r  i n t o  i n d u s t r y ,  f i n a n c e ,  o r  r e a l  e s t a t e  and t h e s e  
r e sou rces  t oge the r  w i l l  a lmost  c e r t a i n l y  a s s u r e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
power. I n  Guatemala, f o r  example, t h e  German immigrant Erwin Paul  D ie se ldo r f ,  
. t h e  l a r g e s t  l and  owner i n  t h e  Department of A l t a  Verapaz, c o n t r o l l e d  15 co f f ee  
. e s t a t e s  wi th  a  t o t a l  a r e a  of a lmost  60,000 manzanas of which 694 were p lan ted  i n  
co f f ee ;  processed a l l  h i s  own co f f ee  t o  t h e  parchment s t a g e ;  acqui red  one of f o u r  
p l a n t s  i n  t h e  A l t a  Verapaz f o r  t h e  f i n a l  p rocess ing  of parchment co f f ee ;  and 
became one of Guatemala's l a r g e s t  e x p o r t e r s  account ing  f o r  some 11,000 q u i n t a l e s  
(1  q u i n t a l  = 46 ki lograms)  of h i s  own and o t h e r ' s  c o f f e e  i n  1936-37 ( ~ a z e z ,  
1970:81,153,163,228). Juan Rafae l  Mora used h i s  and h i s  fami ly ' s  ownership of 
s e v e r a l  c o f f e e  e s t a t e s  i n  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  Costa Rica t o  c o n t r o l  8 percent  of 
t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  expor t s  i n  1845 and 16 pe rcen t  of n a t i o n a l  p rocess ing  capac i ty  i n  
1850. I n  1850 he became p r e s i d e n t  of Costa Rica and i n  1858 h i s  a t tempt  t o  form 
a bank, independent  of o t h e r  co f f ee  p roces se r s  who, then  a s  now, f i nance  t h e  
Costa Rican c rop  l e d  t o  a coup d ' e t a t  i n  1859 and h i s  even tua l  execut ion by 
f i r i n g  squad (Ha l l  1982:45,51; Stone,  1982:197,387). Adolfo Benard, t h e  
Nicaraguan "Sugar King" owned e s t a t e s  of 123, 50, and 65 manzanas i n  co f f ee  i n  
t h e  Department of Carazo and e s t a t e s  of 50, 60, and 90 manzanas i n  Granada i n  
1910 and t h e i r  combined product ion accounted f o r  two pe rcen t  of t h e  Nicaraguan 
t o t a l .  Although he owned two processing p l a n t s  and e x t e n s i v e  sugar  i n t e r e s t s ,  he 
d id  n o t  become involved i n  expor t s  (Calcu la ted  from d a t a  presen ted  i n  Republica 
de Nicaragua, 1910). I n  E l  Salvador i n  1940, t h e  Meardi fami ly  owned twelve 
process ing  p l a n t s  and exported co f f ee  under more than  s i x t y  d i f f e r e n t  brand names 
( c a l c u l a t e d  from d a t a  presen ted  i n  Asociacion C a f e t a l e r a  de E l  Salvador ,  
1940:183-199). The economic and p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  of such major i n t e g r a t e d  
producers  i s  c l e a r l y  much g r e a t e r  than t h a t  of e s t a t e  producers  no t  involved i n  
p roces s ing  o r  expor t  a l though both groups a r e  c l e a r l y  f r a c t i o n s  of t h e  same 
a r i s t o c r a t i c  c l a s s .  It would, of course ,  be p r e f e r a b l e  t o  use  d i r e c t  measures of 
t o t a l  ho ld ings ,  p rocess ing  p l a n t  ownership, and expor t  a c t i v i t y  but Cen t r a l  
American c o f f e e  d a t a  a r e  seldom presen ted  i n  a form which would make such 
measures p o s s i b l e  s o  t h a t  possession of a t  l e a s t  one e s t a t e  w i th  100 manzanas of 
more i n  c o f f e e  w i l l  be used a s  an i n d i r e c t  i n d i c t o r  of an i t e g r a t e d  produceer.  
The d i s t i n c t i o n  beteween e s t a t e  and i n t e g r a t e d  producer  i n  combination wi th  
t h e  e a r l i e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  among sma l l e r  growers y i e l d s  f i v e  f u n c t i o n a l l y  def ined  
c l a s s  p o s i t i o n s  i n  C e n t r a l  American c o f f e e  production--sub-family, family,  smal l  
employer, e s t a t e ,  and i n t e g r a t e d  producer.  Table  1 shows t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
c o f f e e  a r e a  and product ion  by c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  f o r  each of t h e  f o u r  major Cen t r a l  
American c o f f e e  producers  f o r  t i m e  pe r iods  a s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  1950s a s  a v a i l a b l e  
d a t a  permit .  It should be kept  i n  mind t h a t  t h e  a r e a  i n t e r v a l s  used t o  d e f i n e  
c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  always r e f e r s  t o  a r e a  i n  c o f f e e ,  n o t  t o  t h e  t o t a l  a r e a  of t h e  
holding.  I d i o s y n c r a c i e s  of r e p o r t i n g  and t h e  absence of in format ion  on a r e a  i n  
' c o f f e e  f o r  some c o u n t r i e s  make comparisons d i f f i c u l t  and an e f f o r t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
has  been made t o  approximate t h e  f i v e  ca t ego ry  system def ined  by a r e a  i n  c o f f e e  
f o r  each count ry  even i f  t h i s  r e q u i r e s  some e s t i m a t i o n  of da ta .  A d e t a i l e d  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  e s t ima t ion  procedures  used i n  Tables  1-4 may be obtained by 
w r i t i n g  t h e  a u t h o r  d i r e c t l y .  
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The d a t a  i n  Table 1 make i t  p o s s i b l e  n o t  on ly  t o  c l a r i f y  some of t h e  i s s u e s  
r a i s e d  i n  t h e  deba t e s  over  c o f f e e  and c l a s s  i n  Costa Rica and Nicaragua, bu t  a l s o  
t o  compare t h e  c l a s s  systems of each of t h e  C e n t r a l  American co f f ee  producers.  
Three major conc lus ions  can immediately be drawn by in spec t ion  of Table 1. 
F i r s t ,  concen t r a t i on  of both land and product ion  i s  no tab ly  g r e a t e r  i n  Guatemala 
than i t  is  anywhere else i n  Cen t r a l  America. Not on ly  a r e  co f f ee  a r e a  and 
product ion i n  Guatemala more concent ra ted  t han  i n  Costa Rica o r  Nicaragua, they 
a r e  a l s o  much more concent ra ted  than i n  o l i g a r c h i c  E l  Salvador.  Approximately 
two-thirds  of both Guatemalan c o f f e e  a r e a  and product ion a r e  c o n t r o l l e d  by 
i n t e g r a t e d  producers  and an a d d i t i o n a l  17 pe rcen t  is c o n t r o l l e d  by e s t a t e  
producers. Family and sub-family producers are so inconsequential that little 
systematic data is collected on them and the small employer strata is of little 
greater importance. In Guatemala, the dominance of the large estate . in coffee 
production is almost complete. 
Second, Nicaragua and El Salvador show almost identical levels of 
concentration in both coffee area and production. Estate and integrated 
producers control approximately 53 percent of total coffee area in both countries 
and these two classes of large growers actually control a greater proportion of 
production in Nicaragua (64.2 percent) than in El Salvador (58.1 percent). 
Contrary to the view of Baumeister, Nicaragua is not an exception to the pattern 
of estate dominance in Latin American agriculture. The data in Table 1 indicate 
that Nicaragua more closely resembles El Salvador, a country with a well deserved 
reputation for oligarchic dominance, than it does Costa Rica. Only approximately 
500 of some 9,600 coffee farms in Nicaragua in 1957-1958 accounted for half of 
the coffee area and almost two-thirds of total production. The small employer 
strata, while considerably more important than in Guatemala, is actually less 
important in Nicaragua than in El Salvador. The data in Table 1 do not show that 
Baumeister's bourgeoisie "chapiolla" was the dominant factor in prerevolutionary 
Nicaraguan coffee production. In neither Nicaragua nor El Salvador do the 
numerous small holdings of family and sub-family farmers make any substantial 
contribution to production; they control less than a quarter of the coffee area 
in Nicaragua and less than 20 percent in El Salvador. On the basis of the coffee 
class structure in Nicaragua and El Salvador revealed in the data in Table 1, 
similar patterns of oligarchic dominance would be expected in both countries. 
Despite these similarities in land ownership and production, the two coffee 
systems diverge substantially in production techniques, processing technology and 
n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  over  expor t s  s o  t h a t  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  economic b a s i s  and t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  behavior  of t h e  two c o f f e e  e l i t e s  have been very  d i f f e r e n t .  
Although t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  Nicaraguan d a t a  presen ted  i n  Table 1 provide 
l i t t l e .  suppor t  f o r  t h e  Baumeister hypothes i s ,  an examination of t h e  i n t e r n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  Nicaraguan c o f f e e  economy i n d i c a t e s  t h a t ,  a s  might be expected,  
t h e r e  i s  an  element of t r u t h  i n  h i s  argument. Table  2 p r e sen t s  d a t a  organized by 
t h e  same f i v e  c l a s s  c a t e g o r i e s  used i n  Table a l though they  a r e ,  i n  keeping wi th  
Nicaraguan census p r a c t i c e s ,  def ined  i n  terms of product ion  r a t h e r  than a r e a  i n  
c o f f e e  (assuming 1957 y i e l d s ) .  
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The d a t a  i n  Table  2 r e v e a l  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n a l  c o f f e e  systems i n  
Nicaragua. The o r i g i n a l  c e n t e r  of Nicaraguan c o f f e e  product ion ,  t h e  Departments 
of Managua and Carazo (Regions 111 and I V  i n  r evo lu t iona ry  Nicaragua) con t r ibu t ed  
more than  ha l f  of n a t i o n a l  product ion accord ing  t o  t h e  1910 Coffee Census. I n  
t h e s e  departments,  t h e  degree of concen t r a t i on  i n  1957 a c t u a l l y  exceeds t h a t  of 
Guatemala, and a l though it has increased  s l i g h t l y  s i n c e  1910, has  always been 
very  high.  I n  Matagalpa and J ino t ega  (Region VI) ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, e s t a t e  and 
i n t e g r a t e d  producers  c o n t r o l  less product ion a l though t h e  o v e r a l l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of E l  Salvador  i n  t h e  1950s. A s  t h e  d a t a  on percent  of n a t i o n a l  
product ion by department i n d i c a t e ,  Region V I  i s  t h e  most dynamic s e c t o r  of t h e  
Nicaraguan co f f ee  economy. The l ead ing  producing department has  s h i f t e d  from 
Managua i n  1910 t o  Matagalpa i n  1957. Gariazzo e t  a l .  (1983a:4) i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t h e s e  t r e n d s  have cont inued i n  t h e  1960s and 1970s. It i s  a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  
t h e  sma l l  employer s t r a t a  i nc reased  i t s  s h a r e  of t o t a l  product ion i n  Region V I  
between 1910 and 1957 whi le  t h e  e s t a t e  s e c t o r  l o s t  ground. S ince  t h e r e  is  no 
reason  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e s e  t r e n d s  have n o t  cont inued,  t h e  Region V I  da t a  lend  
some suppor t  t o  Baumeister 's  i d e a s  on t h e  importance of t h e  smal l  bourgeois ie  i n  
Nicaraguan c o f f e e  product ion.  Wheelock's model, o n . t h e  o t h e r  hand, f i t s  t h e  
Managua-Carazo r eg ion  b e s t  (Wheelock is  himself  t h e  s c i o n  of two d i s t i ngu i shed  
Managua-Carazo c o f f e e  growing f a m i l i e s )  and t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  e s t a t e  
s e c t o r  i n  Region V I  where he  conducted h i s  f i e l d  r e sea rch  on t h e  l a r g e  c o f f e e  
farm. 
/ The departments  of E s t e l i  and Nueva Segovia (Region I )  c o n t r i b u t e  a  smal l  
sha re  of n a t i o n a l  c o f f e e  product ion but  show a c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  d rama t i ca l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of t h e  r e s t  of Nicaragua o r  of t h e  remainder of Cen t r a l  
America. Small h o l d e r s  and smal l  employers dominated product ion  i n  both 1910 and 
1957 and inc reased  t h e i r  sha re  i n  both departments  i n  t h e  i n t e r c e n s a l  per iod.  
The i n t e g r a t e d  producer s t r a t a  i s  absen t  ' i n  t h e s e  departments ,  and t h e  e s t a t e  
s t r a t a  has  a lmost  d i sappeared  i n  Nueva Segovia,  a l though it r e t a i n s  a  s i z e a b l e  
/ minor i t y  s h a r e  of p roduct ion  i n  E s t e l i .  By 1957 smal l  ho lde r s  dominated 
product ion i n  E s t e l i  and sma l l  employers, i n  Nueva Segovia. S ince  product ion has  
been expanding i n  both t h e s e  reg ions ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  per iod a f t e r  1957, once 
aga in  i t  would appear  t h a t  t h e  e s t a t e  s e c t o r  i s  n o t  t h e  c e n t e r  of dynamism i n  t h e  
Nicaraguan c o f f e e  economy. The d a t a  from Region I provide some a d d i t i o n a l  
suppor t  f o r  Baumeister 's  hypothes i s  a l though t h i s  is  a  r e l a t i v e l y  minor co f f ee  
region.  
The Table 2 d a t a  i n d i c a t e  why Nicaragua is  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  
than t h e  o t h e r  C e n t r a l  American co f f ee  systems. The c o f f e e  s e c t o r  a c t u a l l y  
con ta in s  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s  systems: a  Guatemala-like domination by l a r g e  
e s t a t e s  i n  Managua and Carazo; a  Salvadoran-l ike e s t a t e  s t r u c t u r e  i n  Matagalpa 
and Jinotega challenged by an expanding small employer strata; and a small holder 
I and small employer dominated system in Estell and Nueva Segovia which has no 
exact duplicate elsewhere in Central America. The differing.views of Wheelock 
and Baumeister, then, reflect both the differentiated and changing character of 
the Nicaraguan coffee system. Wheelock's view emphasizes the traditional estate 
system which formed the economic base of the Nicaraguan oligarchy in the period 
before World War 11; Baumeister's model fits best the dynamic new sectors which 
emerged with the rapid expansion of export production in coffee and other crops 
in the post-War period. Although the cross-national comparison of Table 1 would 
simply categorize Nicaragua with ~1 Salvador as a system dominated by an estate 
based oligarchy, the internal data in Table 2 indicate that the Nicaraguan class 
system in coffee is actually considerably more complex. Since both revolutionary 
and counter-revolutionary forces are now engaged in armed competition for the 
support of Region VI coffee growers, the class structure of this area is of more 
than academic interest. Although the political implications of the Wheelock and 
Baumeister views are complex, it is clear that the success of the agrarian 
policies of the revolutionary government of which both are a part will depend, in 
part, on an accurate analysis of the class structure of the Nicaraguan coffee 
economy. 
The third conclusion suggested by the data in Table 1 is similarly mixed. 
There is considerable support for both the Seligson and Hall views of the Costa 
Rican coffee system. It is clear that compared to El Salvador and Nicaragua, to 
say nothing of Guatemala, the small holding farmers control a much more 
substantial share of coffee area and production and that the estate sector is, 
correspondingly, smaller. Small holders are approximately twice as important in 
area and three times as important in production as they are in either Nicaragua 
or El Salvador and the estate sector is, proportionately, approximately a third 
less important in both area and production. Differences of this magnitude 
reflect profound differences in the political and economic power of the coffee 
elites of Nicaragua and El Salvador relative to those of Costa Rica, and tend to 
support Hall's contentions regarding the strength of small holders and the 
weakness of the large estate in Costa Rican coffee production. 
This conclusion must, however, be immediately qualified by noting that the 
most important small holding class is - not the family farmers but rather the 
sub-family farmers who are not only much more numerous but control more 
production and area. Since in 1955, 19,000 of the 22,000 coffee growers in Costa 
Rica fell into the sub-family category, Seligson might well contend that Costa 
Rican -coffee farmers were a semi-proletariat of land starved mini-farmers rather 
than an autonomous yeoman farmer class. The family farm is actually relatively 
insignificant in numbers, area, or production. Furthermore, a small number of 
large estates (184 of 22,000) control 30.6 percent of total coffee area and 37.5 
percent of production. As Seligson contends, there is in fact a high degree of 
concentration in Costa.Rican coffee production, although not so much as elsewhere 
in Central America. Although naive views of Costa Rica as the Switzerland of 
Central America will find .no support form the data in Table 1, Hall's position 
does receive some support from the cross-national comparison. On the other hand, 
Seligson's image of a Costa Rica divided between a few large estates and a mass 
of proletarians is also supported by the data. But the situation is even worse 
elsewhere. 
The data in Table 1 do not, however, provide support for the idea that the 
dominance of an independent yeoman farmer class provides the economic base for 
Costa Rican democracy and Costa Rican exceptionalism in Central America. 
Although comparison between Costa Rica and e i t h e r  Nicaragua o r  E l  Salvador a s  a  
whole g ives  t h e  impression of r e l a t i v e  smal l  ho lder  dominance i n  Costa Rica,  
comparison wi th  a  reg ion  dominated e i t h e r  by smal l  ho lde r s ,  such a s  E s t e l i ,  o r  
sma l l  employers, such a s  Nueva Segovia ( s e e  Table  2)  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  e s t a t e ,  and 
e s p e c i a l l y ,  i n t e g r a t e d  producers  a r e  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  e x e r t  cons iderab le  economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  power over  a  d i spe r sed  and impoverished c l a s s  of sub-family 
farmers .  S ince  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  producers  a l s o  c o n t r o l  t h e  process ing  of t h e  sma l l  
farmer 's  crop,  t h e  dominance i s  even g r e a t e r  than  t h e  a r e a  and product ion d a t a  
a lone  would sugges t .  The f a i l u r e  of t h e  Costa Rican c o f f e e  o l i ga rchy  t o  impose a  
c o f f e e  d i c t a t o r s h i p  of t h e  Salvadoran v a r i e t y  cannot be explained simply by 
fami ly  farm dominance i n  c o f f e e  product ion.  
The d a t a  i n  Table  1 n o t  on ly  provide a  comparative p o r t r a i t  of t h e  e n t i r e  
c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  of C e n t r a l  American c o f f e e  product ion ,  but  a l s o  provides  
in format ion  which makes p o s s i b l e  an assessment of t h e  a b s o l u t e  economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g t h  of C e n t r a l  American c o f f e e  producers ,  both i n d i v i d u a l l y  and a s  
a  c l a s s .  Table  3 p r e s e n t s  t h e  in format ion  i n  Table  1 i n  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
form t o  emphasize t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s .  
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The d a t a  on mean a r e a  and mean product ion of e s t a t e s  w i th  100 manzanas o r  more i n  
c o f f e e  by country,  provide i n d i r e c t  in format ion  about  landed power, b e s t  measured 
by mean a r e a ,  and weal th ,  b e s t  measured by mean product ion ,  of t h e  average 
i n d i v i d u a l  l a r g e  e s t a t e  owner i n  each country.  Once aga in ,  Guatemala is  unique. 
The extremely l a r g e  mean c o f f e e  land a r e a  c o n t r o l l e d  by i n d i v i d u a l  e s t a t e  owners 
(342 manzanas) is  almost  one and a  h a l f  t imes t he  mean s i z e  of l a r g e  e s t a t e s  
elsewhere i n  C e n t r a l  America. It i s  a l s o  n o t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  optimum s i z e  of an 
e s t a t e  seems t o  be approximately t h e  same i n  Costa Rica ,  Nicaragua, and E l  
Salvador--200 manzanas. Contrary t o  H a l l ' s  view, Costa Rican e s t a t e s  a r e  n o t  
markedly sma l l e r  than those  of E l  Salvador  and a r e  i n  f a c t ,  l a r g e r  on average 
than those  of Nicaragua. Comparison w i t h  Guatemala i s ,  of course ,  misleading 
s i n c e  both i n  o v e r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and i n  average  s i z e  of l a r g e  e s t a t e s  i t  is  an 
excep t iona l  case .  
The d a t a  on mean product ion  i n d i c a t e  a  d i s t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  of 
economic power. Salvadoran growers manage t o  produce more c o f f e e  pe r  e s t a t e  than 
Guatemalan growers d e s p i t e  t h e  much sma l l e r  average a r e a  i n  c o f f e e  of t h e i r  
e s t a t e s .  S ince  t h e  Salvadorans a r e  producing more c o f f e e  on less land ,  t h e i r  
e f f i c i e n c y  and hence p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and f i n a n c i a l  power should be g r e a t e r  than t h e  
approximately equa l  average  product ion p e r  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  would 
suggest .  The average product ion  of l a r g e  Costa Rican e s t a t e s  l a g s  somewhat 
behind t h e  average product ion  of Salvadoran o r  Guatemalan e s t a t e s  and t h e  
Nicaraguan i n t e g r a t e d  producers  a r e  t h e  weakest i n  C e n t r a l  America by a  
cons ide rab l e  margin (ha l f  t h e  product ion p e r  e s t a t e  of Costa Rica,  approximately 
a  t h i r d  of t h a t  of Guatemala o r  E l  Sa lvador) .  This  p a t t e r n  of e f f i c i e n c y ,  
. . 
p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and economic s t r e n g t h  of Salvadoran growers and t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  
backwardness, and economic weakness of. Nicaraguan producers  a l s o  appears  i n  d a t a  
on technology and, p roces s ing  t o  be presen ted  below. Although t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
co f f ee  land and product ion  does no t  d i f f e r  app rec i ab ly  i n  t h e  two coun t r i e s ,  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  make t h e  Salvadoran and Nicaraguan growers, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  economic s t r o n g  and weak men of C e n t r a l  America. 
The informat ion  on mean a r e a  and product ion  f o r  e s t a t e s  w i th  more than 100 
manzanas i n  c o f f e e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  two columns i n  Table  3 provides  an  index of t h e  
political and economic power of individual' Central American coffee growers. The 
data on total area and production for all estates with more than 50 manzanas in 
coffee in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 provide an index of the 
absolute political and ecnomic power of the coffee growing classes as a whole. 
Measured once again by control over land, the Guatemalan elite is in a class by 
itself. The total coffee area controlled by large growers in Guatemala is twice 
that of El Salvador, three times that of Nicaragua, and eight times that of Costa . 
Rica. Total production, however, is almost as high in El Salvador as it is in 
Guatemala even though ~uatemalan growers control as a class twice as much land. 
Once again, the Salvadoran elite is distinguished by its greater productivity and 
efficiency. Nicaragua and Costa Rica lag far behind the region's two top 
producers in both total area and total production. ,Although both individually 
and as a class, Costa Rican estate owners produce more coffee per unit area than 
do Nicaraguan growers, the total power of the Costa Rican elite as a whole, 
assessed in terms of either coffee land or production, is actually-less than that 
of the Nicaraguan elite. The reasons for the relative weakness of the Nicaraguan 
and Costa Rican coffee elites are, however, different. The Nicaraguan elite was 
weak because it was inefficient; the Costa Rican elite was weak because it lost 
control over a substantial'share of production to a class of small holders. 
It has been assumed throughout that control over land implies control over 
people, although it is clear that some forms of productive organization lead to 
more control over people than others even if the same amount of land is involved. 
Table 4 assesses this idea directly by presenting the number of workers under 
administrative control by estate owners (resident or permanent workers) and the 
number under temporary control (harvest migrants) for the three Central American 
producers for which data are available. Data are from coffee censuses conducted 
in the period from 1935 to 1942. Data on labor force organization is not 
presented in later censuses. 
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It is clear from the data in Table 4 that the Guatemalan coffee elite controlled 
approximately three times as many resident laborers as did the Salvadoran elite 
even though Salvadoran production was only slightly less than Guatemalan. The 
absolute difference in the size of populations controlled is actually greater 
than these figures suggest because the families of resident laborers usually 
lived with them on the estate. Since' families of permanent workers could be 
mobilized to help in the harvest, the number of outside harvest migrants is 
greater in El Salvador than in Guatemala. Nevertheless, the total harvest labor 
force including hired outsiders, permanent workers, and the working members of 
their families is greater in Guatemala (350,000) than in El Salvador (310,000). 
The data in Table 4 support the relative positions of the Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan coffee elites suggested by the land and production distribution data 
of Tables 1 and 3. Control over more land does translate into control over more 
people, all other things being equal. The- comparative labor force data in Table 
4 also indicate that the El Salvadoran growers used their permanent labor force 
much more efficiently since output per permanent worker is almost three times 
higher in Salvador than in Guatemala. The mechanical limitations of hand picking 
restrict any such dramatic productivity differences in harvesting, however. Once 
again, the Salvadoran elite is distinguished by its vastly more efficient 
production system; the Guatemalan elite, by its greater control over land and 
people in a relatively inefficient system. 
The difference between El Salvador and Guatemala in control over people is 
actually much greater than the data in Table 4 would suggest since control is 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively distinct in the two countries. Since its 
origins in the late nineteenth century, the Guatemalan coffee production system 
has been dominated by various forms of forced labor (Bingham, 1974; Cambranes, 
1982; Garlant, 1968; Grieb, 1979; McCreery, 1983; NaEez, 197'0) which have varied 
only in whether effective control was exercised by the state or individual 
planters. During the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico (1931-1944), the state required 
that the Indian population work a minimum of 100 or 150 days a year for a private 
employer or the state and made 'state employment sufficiently onerous to compel 
labor in coffee (Grieb, 1979:39). Both before and after this period, debt 
servitude and labor contractors under the control of estate owners provided labor 
with only the indirect involvement of the state in maintaining the legal 
structure that made these institutions possible. This system, which continues to 
function today, has been described in detail by Na?fez (1970: 317-348), Pansini 
(1977:9-21), and Schmid (1967:181-204) among others. Typically, laborers were 
advanced money by estate owners but never managed to work off their debts and 
became permanently indebted. Since debts could be inherited by the beginning of 
this century, a distinct class of hereditary serfs (colonos) had developed on 
coffee estates and institutionalized serfdom (colonaje) had come to be sanctified 
in Guatemalan law and custom. In some particularly notorious cases such as the 
Finca San Francisco owned by Enrique Brol (Anon, 1982; personal communication, 
James Birchfield, 1985), owners were able to rule like medieval dukes backed by 
squads of armed guards. Even progressive planters like Erwin Paul Dieseldorf 
intentionally acquired lands simply to control the labor of colonos resident on 
them and combined modern management techniques with medieval labor organization 
(~aIi'ez, 1970:317-348). . Modern corporate farms like "El Pilar" studied by Pansini 
(1977:14-21) used exactly the same legal forms as the most backward grower in 
remote interior regions. -The resident colono labor force was supplemented by 
gangs of harvest migrants (cuadrilleros) who were recruited into fixed term debt 
servitude by a system of advances (habilitaciones) controlled by unscrupulous 
labor contractors (habilitadores). These gang laborers were seldom able to work 
off all their debts and differed from the resident colonos principally in the 
fixed term nature of their contracts and the absence of even the limited legal 
protection afforded the colonos. 
This elaborate legal system of forced labor is not duplicated elsewhere in 
/ 
Central America although varying degrees of extraeconomic coercion such as the 
use of company stores in Nicaragua (Wheelock, 1980:92), rural patrols in Salvador 
(Trujillo, 1980:128) or estate housing or subsistence plots in Costa Rica (Stone 
1980:llO) were universal. Guatemala is unique not only in the numbers of people 
and vast amounts of land controlled by its coffee elite but also in the 
elaboration of an institutionalized system of forced labor backed by both the 
informal armed power of the coffee planters and the formal armed power of the 
state. The observation of one North American visitor in 1908 that Guatemala had 
so many soldiers that it looked like a penal colony (Bingham, 1974:105) is as 
true today as it was then. Backed by domination of Guatemala's most productive 
land, producing its most important source of wealth, and controlling a vast 
dependent population through state sanctioned forced labor, the Guatemalan coffee 
elite became a political force that has no exact parallel in the other coffee 
producing countries. Not even in El Salvador was such extensive control over 
land and people possible. 
The Costa Rican data in Table 4 are not directly comparable with those of El 
~ a l v a d o r  and Guatemala s i n c e  t h e  1935 Costa  Rican c o f f e e  census r e p o r t s  t h e  
number o r  persons working on co f f ee  e s t a t e s ,  n o t  t h e  number of workers r e s i d e n t  
on t h e  e s t a t e s  a s  i n  E l  Salvador o r  Guatemala. Since many Costa Rican c o f f e e  
workers were day r a t h e r  than  r e s i d e n t  l a b o r e r s ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  r e p o r t i n g  
convent ions may r e f l e c t  r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  among t h e  systems. Nevertheless ,  i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Costa Rican e l i t e  could n o t  have c o n t r o l l e d ,  a t  . a  maximum, more 
than a  t h i r d  t h e  number of workers r e s i d e n t  on Guatemalan e s t a t e s  and t h e  a c t u a l  
number of r e s i d e n t  l a b o r e r s  i s  probably cons ide rab ly  l e s s .  Comparison wi th  t h e  
d a t a  on E l  Salvador  i s  probably mis lead ing  f o r  t h e  same reason.  The p r i n c i p a l  
a 
va lue  of t h e  d a t a  i n  Table  4 f o r  Costa Rica i s  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  of 
smal l  ho lde r s  t o  h i r e d  l a b o r e r s  was much h i g h e r  i n  Costa Rica than i n  e i t h e r  E l  
Salvador  o r  Guatemala, a l though t h e  smal l  ho lde r s  and h i r e d  l a b o r e r s  could,  of 
course ,  be t h e  same people.  Nevertheless ,  i t  is  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Costa Rican e l i t e  
faced  a  lower c l a s s  d iv ided  by t h e  ownership of smal l  amounts of property.  Class  
p o l a r i z a t i o n  was cons ide rab ly  more advanced i n  E l  Salvador  and Guatemala than i t  
was i n  Costa Rica.  When t h e  Costa Rican co f f ee  e l i t e  e v e n t u a l l y  faced  a  
cha l lenge  from r u r a l  workers ,  it came from workers i n  bananas, no t  co f f ee  
(Se l igson ,  1980:49). 
The a n a l y s i s  of l and ,  co f f ee ,  and people  demonstrates  t h a t  Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran growers, both i n d i v i d u a l l y  and a s  c l a s s e s ,  were both r e l a t i v e l y  
powerful bu t  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  reasons.  The Guatemalan c o f f e e  e l i t e  c o n t r o l l e d  more 
land and people and c o n t r o l l e d  t he  people more t i g h t l y  than  d i d  any o t h e r  c o f f e e  
e l i t e  i n  C e n t r a l  America. I ts  power r e s t e d  on t h e  c a p t i v e  a l l e g i a n c e  of i t s  
s e r f s  and t h e  armed f o r c e  a t  i t s  command. The Salvadoran p l a n t e r  e l i t e  became 
t h e  most p roduct ive ,  e f f i c i e n t ,  and p r o f i t a b l e  i n  C e n t r a l  America. But it  
c o n t r o l l e d  fewer people and con t ro l l ed  them l e s s  secure ly .  Its power was more 
financial than military although it too used a captive state for its own 
purposes. The coffee elites of Nicaragua and Costa Rica gained neither the 
military and political power of the Guatemalans nor the financial power of the 
Salvadorans. Although control of Nicaraguan coffee land was as concentrated as 
it was in El Salvador, the Nicaraguan coffee elite never approached the 
productive efficiency of the Salvadorans and remained the least productive 
planter class in Central America. Its low level of productivity severely 
restricted its financial power. Although many Costa Rican growers controlled 
estates as large as any in Central America outside Guatemala, as a class they 
never gained the concentrated control over land and production achieved in El 
Salvador or Nicaragua. Instead, they shared this control with a persistent class 
of sub-family farmers. The coffee elites of Guatemala and El Salvador gained 
political and financial power, respectively. The elites of Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua failed to gain political or financial power, respectively. These 
differences are further accentuated by substantial differences in control over 
production technology, processing, and export. 
Production, Processing, Export 
The differences in production per unit area evident in Tables 1, 3, and 4 
are based on substantial differences in the technology of production and 
superiority in production tends to be associated with technical sophistication in 
processing as well. As might be expected from these data, El Salvador has been 
the traditional leader in production technology followed by Costa Rica. 
Guatemala lags behind Costa Rica and is far behind El Salvador; Nicaragua is at 
or slightly behind the Guatemalan level. In processing, Costa Rica and Salvador 
are the clear leaders with Guatemala close behind and Nicaragua trailing with 
remarkable low levels of efficiency for most of its history. 
Table 5 p r e s e n t s  t h r e e  r e a d i l y  a c c e s s i b l e  i n d i c e s  of t e c h n i c a l  
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  i n  product ion:  a r a b i c a  v a r i e t y ;  f e r t i l i z e r  use;  and d e n s i t y  of 
p l an t ings .  By t h e  1950s Salvador  had a l r e a d y  made t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  C e n t r a l  American v a r i e t i e s ,  Typica and Maragogipe, t o  t h e  h a r d i e r  and 
h ighe r  y i e l d i n g  Bourbon s t r a i n .  I n  1957 more than two-thirds  of Salvadoran 
c o f f e e  a r e a  was i n  modern v a r i e t i e s  wh i l e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  had ha rd ly  begun i n  
e i t h e r  Nicaragua o r  Guatemala and extended t o  on ly  approximately a t h i r d  of t h e  
c o f f e e  a r e a  i n  Costa Rica.  
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Although f e r t i l i z e r  use  s t a t i s t i c s  by a r e a  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  E l  Salvador ,  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  of Costa Rica compared t o  Nicaragua and Guatemala i s  t h e  same 
a s  i n  t h e  v a r i e t y  sub-table .  I n  t h e  1950s o rgan ic  o r  chemical f e r t i l i z e r s  were 
used on 35.7 percent  of t h e  t o t a l  c o s t a  Rican co f f ee  a r ea .  The corresponding 
f i g u r e s  f o r  Nicaragua and Guatemala a r e  5.0 and 11.9 percent  r e spec t ive ly .  
Densi ty  .o f  p l a n t i n g s  was almost  twice  a s  g r e a t  i n  Salvador a s  i t  was i n  
Guatemala. The r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  Nicaraguan dens i ty  d a t a  i s  ques t i onab le  s i n c e  
it appears  t o  be census p r a c t i c e  t o  assume r a t h e r  than  count 1,000 t r e e s  per  
manzana. The t e c h n i c a l  s u p e r i o r i t y  of E l  Salvador  i s  i n d i c a t e d  most c l e a r l y  i n  
y i e l d s  (expressed i n  p i n t a l e s  pe r  manzana) f o r  s e l e c t e d  pe r iods  from World War 
I1 t o  t h e  p re sen t  (Table 6). For most of t h e  per iod ,  Salvadoran y i e l d s  a r e  more 
than twice t hose  of Guatemala o r  Nicaragua and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  than those  
of Costa Rica.  By 1978 government sponsored t e c h n i c a l  development programs i n  
Costa Rica had reversed  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  of E l  Salvador and Costa Rica and 
by 1980 Costa Rica was c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  lead .  S t i l l ,  f o r  most of t h e  per iod ,  
Salvador had the highest yields not only in Central America but in all of Latin 
America and, with the exception of some relatively minor producers, the highest 
yields in the world (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 1981:184). 
By 1980 Costa Rica had assumed the lead in both Central and South America and, 
excepting minor producers, had the third highest yields in the world (Ibid.). 
The differences in production technology between El Salvador and Costa Rica 
on the one hand and Guatemala and Nicaragua on the other are pronounced and have 
been so for some time. In June, 19374 the Colombian agronomist Juan Pablo Duque 
made a survey of Central American production for the Colombian coffee board which 
was worried about increased competition. His description of the relative 
technical positions of the four Central American coffee systems (Duque, 1938), 
summarized in Table 7, is echoed in other cross-national surveys (Cardoso, 1975; 
Hearst, 1929; Jamaica Coffee Industry Board, 1959; Torres-Rivas, 1975) as well as 
in studies of the technical organization of individual systems (Browning, 1971; 
Dominguez, 1970; Gariazzo et al., 1983a; 1983b; Hall, 1978, 1982; Keith, 1974; 
Morrison and Norris, 1954; ~a?feez, 1970; Radell, 1964). 
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. Although production technology has changed over the twentieth century, the 
relative positions of the four producers remained constant until the Costa Rican 
surge in the 1970s. Duque (1938: 41,50) found that harvesting techniques were 
similar in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala although more passes were made 
in Costa Rica. In Nicaragua, however, then as now, pickers strip or milk the 
branches of a mixture of ripe and unripe berries, leaves, twigs, buds, and other 
detritus damaging the trees, reducing yields and producing a low grade of coffee 
(Duque, Ibid.:45; Hea r s t ,  1929:120; P l a y t e r ,  1927:26; Radel l ,  1964:48). It i s  
not  e n t i r e l y  c l e a r  why t h i s  p r a c t i c e  has p e r s i s t e d  i n  t h e  f a c e  of determined 
government and p r i v a t e  e f f o r t s  t o  suppress  i t ,  but  i t  may be r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  backwardness of Nicaraguan process ing  technology which cannot produce 
h igher  grades  of c o f f e e  no mat te r  what q u a l i t y  harves ted  f r u i t  i s  used a s  i npu t  
(Kei th ,  1974:92; Rade l l ,  1964:25,51). I n  pruning ,  Costa Rica and E l  Salvador had 
a d i s t i n c t  advantage s i n c e  i n  most a r e a s  of Nicaragua and Guatemala, t h e  co f f ee  
bush was al lowed t o  grow f r e e l y  wi th  on ly  maintenance c u t t i n g  (Duque:23-36). I n  
Nicaragua t h e  e l a b o r a t e  pruning system developed by t h e  progress ive  grower Arturo 
Vaughan ("poda Vaughan") i s  used on some of t h e  l a r g e r  e s t a t e s  on t h e  Carazo 
p l a t e a u  bu t  n o t  e lsewhere (Radel l ,  1964:16). The d i s t i n c t  Costa Rican s t y l e  of 
pruning which encouraged candelabra- l ike branching had some success  among 
p rog re s s ive  p l a n t e r s  i n  Guatemala but  was n o t  g e n e r a l l y  adopted (Dominguez, 
1970: 134,138). I n  1937 Duque (Ibid.:  - 5 )  found a "grea t  preoccupation" wi th  t h e  
use  of chemical f e r t i l i z e r s  i n  Costa Rica and t h e  1935 co f f ee  census found - t h a t  
30 percent  of Costa Rican c o f f e e  lands  were f e r t i l i z e d  (Costa Rica,  I n s t i t u t o  de 
Defensa d e l  cafe '  de Costa Rica ,  1935:59). Th i s  compares w i th  5.0 percent  of 
Nicaraguan and 11.9 pe rcen t  of Guatemalan c o f f e e  lands  a s  l a t e  a s  t h e  1950s 
(Table 5) .  Duque (Ibid.: lO) - a l s o  found an a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  i n  f e r t i l i z e r s  i n  E l  
Salvador a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  ex t ens ive  use  of t h e  i z o t e  p l a n t  (yucca sp.) a s  a 
f e r t i l i z e r  supplement o r  s u b s t i t u t e .  Nicaraguan growers used very l i t t l e  
f e r t i l i z e r  t hen  and, i n  s u b s t a n t i a l  a r e a s  of t h e  country,  very l i t t l e  now 
(Gariazzo e t  a l .  1983b:12). Duque a l s o  found s u b s t a n t i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  f e r t i l i z e r  
among Guatemalan p l a n t e r s  bu t  ~ o m i n ~ u e z  (1970:167) r e p o r t s  t h a t  i t s  use was 
confined t o  German p l a n t e r s  and t h e  d a t a  i n  Table  5 i n d i c a t e  t h a t  f e r t i l i z e r  use  
w a s  no t  widespread i n  t h e  1950s; Costa Rican and E l  Salvadoran p l a n t e r s  used t h e  
most advanced techniques of harvesting, pruning, and fertilization. Nicaragua 
used the most primitive methods in all three areas, and Guatemala used advanced 
techniques in harvesting only. 
Transportation technology was most highly developed in El Salvador and Costa 
Rica where good roads made it possible to use ox carts and later trucks to 
quickly bring harvested berries from farm to processing plant (Duque, 
Ibid.:40,47-48; Hearst, 1929:42-44; Seligson, 1982:34). The primitive 
transportation network of North Central Nicaragua made even the use of ox carts 
difficult and much coffee was moved on the back of mules. Roads were better in 
the Managua-Carazo area but much of the crop was moved by mule or oxcart rather 
than by truck (Duque, - Ibid.:45-46; Radell, 1964:27,.54). In Guatemala there were. 
also regional variations but in general carts, pack animals, and unique in 
Central America, human bearers were used to transport coffee (Biechler, 1970:18; 
mJ 
Duque, Ibid.:50; Nanez, 1970:251-253). In the remote Alta Verapaz region, human 
r /  
bearers carried 100 pound bags of coffee as much as forty miles (Nanez, 
Ibid.:284). The poorly developed transportation system of Nicaragua severely 
restricted the development of processing technology since the harvested crop 
could not be brought to a central location quickly enough to avoid spoilage. In 
Guatemala, where most estates were large enough to afford their own processing 
plants, poor transportation did not restrict processing as severely but much 
coffee was still sold in the partially processed parchment stage (Biechler, 
1970: 171-172). 
Processing technology, too, was most advanced in Costa Rica and El Salvador 
where imported European and North American power driven equipment was extensively 
used in large industrial installations frequently located off the farm in cities 
or other central locations (Duque, Ibid.:51; Hall, 1982:50-51; Hearst, 
1929:139-140; Seligson, 1982:34). European, especially German, growers in 
Guatemala were responsible for many of the technical innovations in the coffee 
industry world-wide including development of the widely used "Guardiola" and 
"Okrassa" coffee dryers and the "Smout" and "Okrassa" shellers and polishers, but - 
technological innovation ceased after World War I and the processing industry 
stagnated (Dominguez, 1970:264-265). In the 1930s Duque (Ibid.:51) found that 
the processing industry in Guatemala trailed those of Costa Rica and El Salvadbr 
and the gap is even wider today. In the Managua region of Nicaragua the 
development of processing was handicapped not only by poor transportation but 
also by a shortage of water, and before World War I1 as much as half of the crop 
was processed using- the dry method. Even though by the 1950s 90 percent of the 
crop was wet processed, the shortage of water led to the improper washing of much 
of it. In Carazo, where- transportation was better, the water shortage also led 
to improper washing although most of the crop, was processed in centralized plants 
as in El Salvador and Costa Rica. In North Central Nicaragua there was plenty of 
water but so few roads that partial wet, processing was done with homemade 
equipment and much coffee was stored for weeks or months before being processed 
(Keith, 1974:92; Radell, 1964:24-26,51). As a result, it was impossible to 
maintain quality standards in Nicaraguan coffee while quality control was high in 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and even in Guatemala. 
Duque's observations on the superiority of Costa Rican and El Salvadoran 
processing technology are also supported by the data in Table 8 which show the 
'number of processing plants in each of the four countries for the period from 
the late nineteenth .century to the present. 
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A s  a  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  t h e  sma l l e r  t h e  number of p l a n t s ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e i r  
t e chno log ica l  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  number of farms served by a  given 
p roces so r ,  and t h e  b e t t e r  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system on which they depend. A 
smal l  number of p l a n t s  a l s o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  they  a r e  i n d u s t r i a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
l o c a t e d  o f f  t h e  farm o f t e n  i n  urban a r e a s .  Costa Rica and E l  Salvador have 
always had a  r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l '  number of p rocess ing  p l a n t s ,  approximately 200 
before  World War 11, and by 1972 t h e  number dec l ined  t o  114 i n  E l  Salvador and 83 
i n  Costa Rica.  The much g r e a t e r  number of p rocess ing  p l a n t s  i n  Nicaragua i s  a  
r e s u l t  of t h e  l a r g e  number of homemade w e t  p rocess ing  systems i n  t h e  
Matagalpa-Jinotega reg ion .  I n  Guatemala t h e  l a r g e  number r e f l e c t s  a  
d e c e n t r a l i z e d  l a r g e  e s t a t e  based process ing  system. Since i n  t h e  1950s Salvador 
and Guatemala processed approximately equa l  amounts of c o f f e e ,  t h e  average 
Salvadoran p l a n t  processed more than t e n  t i m e s  a s  much c o f f e e  a s  t he  t y p i c a l  
Guatemalan p l a n t  and t h e  s c a l e  of t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  v a r i e s  accordingly.  I n  f a c t ,  E l  
Salvador  possesses  what i s  s a i d  t o  be t h e  l a r g e s t  p rocess ing  p l a n t  i n  Cen t r a l  
America, E l  Molino (Wellman, 1961:Plate 27, f a c i n g  p.177). The r e l a t i v e  numbers 
of Salvadoran and Costa Rican p l a n t s  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  s c a l e  of Costa Rican 
technology is  s i m i l a r .  Observation of p l a n t  ope ra t i ons  i n  t h e  Barba canton of 
Costa Rica by t h e  au tho r  s u b s t a n t i a t e s  t h i s .  Although Salvador  has  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
been t h e  l e a d e r  i n  product ion technology, both Costa Rica and Salvador have 
h igh ly  devqloped process ing  systems. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  Costa Rican c o f f e e  e l i t e ,  a s  
H a l l  (1982:52-53) and Se l igson  (1975:24-25) both a rgue ,  i s  l a r g e l y  an e l i t e  of 
c o f f e e  p roces se r s ,  n o t  producers.  
Given the substantial economic gains to be realized through scientific 
cultivation and industrial processing, it might be'asked why all the Central 
American countries did not follow the path of Salvador and later Costa Rica 
toward the full rationalization of both production and processing. For Nicaragua 
the answer, as Wheelock (1980) has demonstrated, is to be found in the politics 
of intervention. In 1910 Nicaragua took its first coffee census '- a remarkably 
detailed document. In 1912 the united States Marines arrived not to leave again 
until 1933. Their war against Augusto Cesar Sandino was fought in the heart of 
the Matagalpa-Jinbtega coffee belt and there is little doubt that the 
intervention stopped the rationalization and expansion of production in what 
- .  
later would become Nicaragua's most dynamic coffee zone. It was not until the 
1950s that expansion resumed in this region. Nicaragua did not 'take another 
coffee census until 1957. The intervention aiso deprived the coffee elite of 
control over exports which passed into the hands of American banks. 
In Guatemala, united States ' intervention involved bananas not coffee (Jonas 
and Tobis, 1974; Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982) and estate size was certainly 
large enough to generate capital for modernization. The failure to rationalize 
the industry is clearly related to the temptations of forced labor and a racist 
legal structure. With labor virtually free for the taking, thanks to state 
enforced debt servitude, and the Indian population with almost no protection from 
planter land grabs, there was little incentive to rationalize production. Land 
costs remained vastly lower in Guatemala than in Costa Rica (Cardoso, 1977:175; 
I 
I Stone, 1980:96) and wage levels were the lowest in Central America (Duque, 
I 
1 - Ibid.:58; Hearst 1929:125). Indeed, what is surprising about Guatemala is not 
how little rationalization of production took place, but how much. But it took 
place almost entirely among German planters who were more closely tied to world 
c a p i t a l i s m  than  t o  t h e  e x t r a c t i v e  s o c i e t y  of c o l o n i a l  Guatemala. Once' t h e  
Germans were expropr ia ted  dur ing  World War 11, t h e  Guatemalan c o f f e e  e l i t e  
r e v e r t e d  t o  doing what it had always done b e s t  - l i v i n g  i n  luxury on t h e  t r i b u t e  
of a  c a p t i v e  Ind ian  populat ion.  Technological  innovat ion  stopped and p l a n t e r s  
and t h e i r  a l l i e s  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  devoted themselves t o  t h e  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  no t  
of c o f f e e  product ion but  of s t a t e  t e r r o r .  
Costa Rica lagged behind E l  Salvador  i n  product ion technology but  n o t  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  of p rocess ing .  Although t h e  e l i t e  of i n t e g r a t e d  producers 
r a p i d l y  moderized and l a r g e  e s t a t e s  such as Aquiares s t u d i e d  by Morrison and 
Norr i s  (1954) o r  Concavas s t u d i e d  by H a l l  (1978) were models of p roduct ive  
e f f i c i e n c y ,  t h e  y i e l d  f i g u r e s  f o r  sma l l e r  growers ( s ee  Table 1 above) i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  they were slow t o  r a t i o n a l i z e  product ion.  The smal l  growers remained 
c a p t i v e s  of t h e  process ing  p l a n t  owners u n t i l  t h e  economic c r i s i s  of t h e  
depress ion  when t h e  es tab l i shment  of t h e  I n s t i t u t o  de Def ensa d e l  ~ a f  e' s h i f t e d  
.-*- 
some measure of c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  s t a t e .  Af t e r  t h e  1948 r evo lu t ion ,  t h e  Of ic ina  d e l  
cafe/ pushed through a  t e c h n i c a l  development program t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  benef i ted  -
t h e  sma l l  growers and caused Costa Rican y i e l d s  t o  exceed those  of E l  Salvador by 
t h e  1970s (Ha l l ,  1980:153,159; S e l i g t s o n ,  1975:28). A s  long a s  t h e  impoverished 
sub-family co f f ee  farmers  of Costa Rica were under t h e  u n r e s t r i c t e d  c o n t r o l  of 
tWe c o f f e e  process ing  e l i t e ,  they lacked both t h e  c a p i t a l  and t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
knowledge necessary  t o  r a t i o n a l i z e  product ion.  The f a i l u r e  of t h e  smal l  
producers  t o  modernize without  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  another  i n d i c a t i o n  of t he  - 
unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n  of wea l th  and power i n  t h e  Costa Rican c o f f e e  system. 
I n  E l  Salvador t h e  complete r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of product ion and process ing  
e a r l y  i n  t h e  cen tury  enabled t h e  c o f f e e  e l i t e  t o  move downstream i n t o  expor t  and 
thereby  ga in  c o n t r o l  of what ~ e b a s t i t f n  (1979: 950-951 ) c a l l s  t h e  "power pyramid" 
of c o f f e e  land ,  p rocess ing ,  and expor t .  The d a t a  i n  Table 9  show t h i s  t h i s  
p a t t e r n  a s  it e x i s t e d  i n  1940 according t o  t h e  f i r s t  Salvadoran co f f ee  census 
( ~ s o c i a c i d n  C a f e t a l e r a  de E l  Salvador ,  1940: 183-199). 
The census l i s ts  t h e  names of t h e  owners of a l l  p rocess ing  p l a n t s  i n  he country 
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  ho lde r s  of a l l  expor t  l i c e n s e s  l i s t e d  by expor t  brand name. 
Although t h e  number of expor t  brands i s  only  an approximate measure of expor t  
a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  l i s t i n g  of owners by name makes t h e  1940 census a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
va luab le  source  on t h e  ove r l ap  i n  process ing  and expor t  i n  E l  Salvador.  The l e f t  
h a l f  of Table  9  lists,. by fami ly  surname,. t h e  number of p rocess ing  p l a n t s  and 
expor t  brands c o n t r o l l e d  by f a m i l i e s  w i th  f o u r  o r  more process ing  p l a n t s  i n  
descending o r d e r  of t h e  number of p l a n t s  c o n t r o l l e d .  It i s  c l e a r  from t h e s e  d a t a  
t h a t  a lmost  a l l  l a r g e  p roces se r s  were a l s o  a c t i v e  expor t e r s .  The r i g h t  h a l f  of 
Table 9  l i s t s  by f ami ly  name, t h e  number of expor t  brands and process ing  p l a n t s  
c o n t r o l l e d  by those  f a m i l i e s  and companies w i th  t h e  l a r g e s t  number of r e g i s t e r e d  
expor t  brands i n  descending o rde r  by t h e  number of expor t  brand names. It is  
c l e a r  from t h e s e  d a t a  t h a t  t h e  most a c t i v e  e x p o r t e r s  were, f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  
a l s o  owners of l a r g e  numbers of bene f i c io s .  The except ions  t o  t h i s  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  a r e  l a r g e l y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  f i r m s  l i k e  Cura ao  o r  Nottlebohm f 
who a r e  p r i m a r i l y  buyers n o t  p rocessors .  S t i l l ,  w i th  t h e s e  except ions ,  t h e  names 
on both l i s ts  r e p r e s e n t  a  who's who of t h e  Salvadoran o l iga rchy  (c f .  Aubey, 
1968-1969; Baloyra,  1982; Col indres ,  1977). The "power pyramid" of c o f f e e  
process ing  and expor t  i n  E l  Salvador confer red  power over  o t h e r  expor t  c rops ,  
e x p e c i a l l y  c o t t o n  and sugar ,  and f r e q u e n t l y  c o n t r o l  i n  f i nance  and i n d u s t r y  a s  
wel l .  Torres-Rivas (1982) has  c a l l e d  t h e  C e n t r a l  American e l i t e  a  "three-footed 
beast ' '  w i t h  one f o o t  i n  expor t  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  one i n  f i n a n c e ,  and one i n  indus t ry .  
No c o f f e e  e l i t e  i n  C e n t r a l  America f i t s  t h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  b e t t e r  than t h e  
Salvadoran. An e l i t e  of f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  producers  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  co f f ee  system 
and much else a s  w e l l .  
The most dramatic  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  product ion  system and 
powerful c o f f e e  e l i t e  of E l  Salvador is  t h e  ca se  of Nicaragua, The .Nicaraguan 
co f f ee  e l i t e  achieved n e i t h e r  t h e  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of co f f ee  product ion nor 
hegemonic power i n  Nicaraguan economy o r  s o c i e t y .  Table  10 p r e s e n t s  a  l ist  of 
i n d i v i d u a l s  who might have been t h e  founders  of t h e  Nicaraguan c o f f e e  o l i ga rchy  
i f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  c i v i l  war, and t h e  rise of t h e  Somoza dynasty had n o t  undermined 
t h e i r  economic and t e c h n i c a l  power and denied them a  p o l i t i c a l  opening. 
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The t a b l e  shows t h e  11 l a r g e s t  growers i n  t h e  Department of Carazo a s  they were 
recorded i n  t h e  1910 c o f f e e  census ( ~ e ~ t b l i c a  de Nicaragua, 1910) on t h e  eve of 
t h e  1912 United S t a t e s  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  I n  1910 Carazo was n o t  on ly  t h e  department 
wi th  t h e  second l a r g e s t  ( a f t e r  Managua) product ion ,  bu t  a l s o  possessed r e l a t i v e l y  
f avo rab l e  growing cond i t i ons  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  p rog re s s ive  p l a n t e r s .  The 
l a r g e s t  producer was Ar turo  Vaughan (mispe l led  Vaugham i n  t h e  census) ,  t h e  
developer  of t h e  system of pruning which bea r s  h i s  name. H i s  l e ad ing  p o s i t i o n  
was due n o t  t o  h i s  c o n t r o l  over  a  l a r g e  a r e a  i n  c o f f e e  bu t  r a t h e r  t o  h i s  complete 
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of product ion.  H i s  y i e l d s  of 22.5 quintales/manzana a c t u a l l y  
exceed t h e  n a t i o n a l  average of Costa Rica,  L a t i n  America's t e chno log ica l  l e a d e r ,  
i n  1982. Vaughan might be taken a s  t y p i c a l  of t h e  Salvadoran-type i n t e g r a t e d  
producer who might have formed, a long w i t h  o t h e r  t echno log ica l ly  progress ive  
p l a n t e r s ,  t h e  nucleus of a Nicaraguan c o f f e e  o l igarchy .  Vaughan's e s t a t e ,  San 
Franc isco ,  is  s t i l l  owned by h i s  fami ly  and i s  i n  product ion  today; t h e  c u r r e n t  
owner, a l s o  named Arturo,  has  d i v e r s i f i e d  t o  become one of Nicaragua's l a r g e s t  
egg producers .  
But it was n o t  t h e  descendents  of Ar tu ro  Vaughan and o t h e r  t echno log ica l ly  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  producers  such a s  Carlos  Wheelock i n  nearby Managua who became t h e  
mas te rs  of Nicaragua, but  t h e  son of t h e  11 th  l a r g e s t  producer i n  Carazo whose 
y i e l d s  were on ly  a t h i r d  (7.8 quintaleslmanzana)  of t hose  of Arturo Vaughan and 
who d i d  n o t  c o n t r o l  s u f f i c i e n t  l and  t o  be inc luded  i n  t h e  " in t eg ra t ed  producer" 
c l a s s  i n  t h i s  s tudy.  The rise of Anas tas io  Somoza t o  become r u l e r  of Nicaragua 
and i t s  l a r g e s t  c o f f e e  producer was, of cou r se ,  based on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  power 
I p o l i t i c s ,  n o t  c o f f e e  weal th .  Anas tas io  Somoza Garcla  was s u f f i c i e n t l y  
impoverished t o  have worked a s  a used c a r  d e a l e r  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  and gained 
h i s  p o l i t i c a l  prominence i n  p a r t  through h i s  command of Engl ish ( M i l l e t ,  
1977:51). It would t ake  a r evo lu t ion  t o  b r i n g  t o  power t h e  co f f ee  growing 
Wheelock fami ly  i n  t h e  person of Jaime Wheelock, a member of t h e  FSLN ' ( ~ r e n t e  
S a n d i n i s t a  de ~ i b e r a c i d n  Nacional) s i n c e  1969 and c u r r e n t l y  Nicaraguan Min i s t e r  
of Agr i cu l tu re .  But Wheelock's p o l i c i e s  f o r  t h e  r eo rgan iza t ion  of c o f f e e  
product ion  a r e  a s  f a r  a s  could be imagined from t h e  dreams of o l i g a r c h s ,  
Nicaraguan o r  Salvadoran. 
Although some members of t h e  1910 Carazo p l a n t e r  e l i t e  owned t h e i r  own 
process ing  p l a n t s  (Table l o ) ,  none owned a s  many a s  members of t h e  Salvadoran 
e l i t e  and i n  f a c t ,  Carazo c o f f e e  process ing  technology was i n  a prolonged s t a t e  
of a r r e s t e d  development because of a sho r t age  of water .  Exports were, of 
cou r se ,  c o n t r o l l e d  by American banks i n  p a r t n e r s h i p  w i t h  t h e  Nicaraguan n a t i o n a l  
bank. Two families of Carazo planters listed in Table 10, the Rappacciolis and 
the Baltodanos, did become major factors in exports in the 1950s, but by then 
they had fallen behind their counterparts in El Salvador or Costa Rica in 
accumulating export based economic power. Furthermore, their ability to 
diversify into other areas of the economy or even expand their coffee holdings 
was severely limited by the dominance of Somoza family interests. 
Technologically backward in both production and processing, deprived of control 
over exports, and hemmed in by the Somozas, the Nicaraguan coffee elite never 
completed the transition form estate to integrated producers. If the,Salvadoran 
coffee oligarchy rested on a power pyramid of coffee, processing, and export, the 
Nicaraguan coffee economy was a pyramid without a base. 
CONCLUSIONS: COFFEE AND POLITICS 
The empirical analysis has demonstrated that each of the four principal 
Central American coffee producers gained a relative advantage in one phase of the 
production process: Guatemala, in land and people; El Salvador, in production; 
Costa Rica, in processing; and Nicaragua, in nothing. The relative positions of 
the four producers ca. 1940 are shown in Figure 1 where an "X" represents a 
relative advantage in the development of one phase of the production sequence. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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The Guatemalan elite, particualarly in its national sector, was characterized by 
large estates, large amounts of land under estate control and large numbers of 
people under tight seignorial restrictions. Estates owned by Guatemalan 
nationals were never characterized by rationalized production technology and, 
before World War 11, processing and exports were largely controlled by Germans. 
Salvadoran coffee estates did not match those of Guatemala in size or number of 
people under direct control. Indeed, the Salvadorans substituted migratory 
harvest for resident labor gaining economic efficiency by surrendering a 
substantial measure of the kind of political control exercised by the Guatemalan 
elite. But the Salvadoran producers became, for much of the century, the most 
efficient in the world and this substantial technical advantage translated into 
control over both processing and export. As Figure 1 indicctes, Salvadoran 
producers moved downstream to completely control the coffee producton process 
from field to wharve and thereby became the only fully integrated producers in 
Central America. The Costa Rican elite never managed to separate a persistent 
class of mini-farmers from their tiny coffee fields and instead moved downstram 
into processing which gave them indirect economic control over the mini-farmers 
but lost them any claim to the political hegemony exercised by the Guatemalans. 
Their control over advanced processing technology led, in turn, to control over 
exports but the processing-export complex lacked the key element in the 
Salvadoran power pyramid -- control over coffee land and production. In 
Nicaragua none of the elements of the Salvadoran pyramid emerged. Hobbled by 
United States' intervention and dynastic rule, the Nicraguan elite failed to 
carve out a distinct base of economic power in any phase of the production 
process. 
These differences in both the nature and the strength of the economic base 
of the Central American coffee elftes generated both differing elite structures 
and differing forms of social and political behavior. Table 11 presents lists of 
the members of the "oligarchies" of Nicargua, Guatemala, and El Salvador (no 
comparable data was available for Costa Ricaa) constructed by researchers with 
other interests. An "X" next to a family name indicates that the family fortune 
was or is based on coffee wealth. Although the measure is a crude one and the 
definitions of "oligarchy" differ somewhat in the various sources noted in Table 
11, a clear pattern emerges. 
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As might be expected, the Salvadoran coffee elite dominates the Salvadoran 
oligarchy with the fortunes of approximately two-thirds (19 of 30) of its 
families based on coffee wealth. In Guatemala where the oligarchy derived its 
wealth from commerical and industrial activity as well as from coffee, the 
proportion of coffee families is lower but still substantial' (11 of 20). In 
Nicaragua only 5 of the 21 members of Wheelock's (1980:188) "financial oligarchy" 
came from families whose wealth was based primarily on coffee. The list is 
heavily weighed toward the pre-coffee colonial cattle raising elite (Cardenal, 
Chamoro, Sacasa, Pellas) or the post-coffee cotton barons (Montealegre, Reyes, 
Lacayo). Of the Carazo growers listed in Table 10 above only the families of 
Tefel, Baltodano, and Gonzales make it onto Wheelock's list and Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle is, of course, a special case. Arturo Vaughan is nowhere to be seen 
despite his family's continued economic activity in Nicaragua. Coffee brought 
great economic power to the Salvadoran elite, lesser but still substantial power 
to the Guatemalan elite and very little power to the Nicaraguan elite. In the 
case of Costa Rica, Stone (1982:351) argues that coffee planters were an 
important, but far from the only, source of capital for other sectors of the 
economy. His data suggest that in economic power, the Costa Rican elite falls 
somewhere between the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan elites and probably closer to the 
former. It should be kept in mind that Table 11 lists members of the economic 
elite only and therefore understates the immense political power granted to the 
coffee barons of Guatemala through their control of serfs and armed men. But it 
further emphasizes the difference in the base of power of the Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan elites. 
The diverse political fates of these four coffee elites who have dominated 
Central American society and politics for more than a century closely correspond 
to the strength and character of their economic base. In Nicaragua a 
revolutionary movement rising from the hills of the Matagalpa-Jinotega coffee 
zone overwhelmed a government without a base in a we'akened coffee oligarchy. In 
the end, even if the Nicaraguan coffee oligar'ch's had wanted to form a united 
front with Somoza, they lacked the economic and political power to do so. 
Although some joined him, many others, or their sons, joined the opposition. The 
very wells from which Somoza drew his strength -- his total control over 
Nicaraguan economy and society - fatally weakened his natural allies in the 
coffee oligarchy. The United States' intervention in the 1920s and 1930s 
destroyed just that social group that has proved to be its most loyal ally in 
Guatemala and El Salvador in the 1970s and 1980s - the coffee oligarchy. In 
Guatemala the coffee elite and, increasingly, its allies in the military have 
used the immense repressive apparatus of a forced labor society to fend off 
continual challenges from below, although with increasing difficulty. The 
Salvadoran coffee elite, the strongest economic force in Central America, 
paradoxically finds itself in sufficient difficulty to require extensive outside 
military aid. It also was forced to weather the only mass Communist insurrection 
in Latin American history in the matanza of 1932. Displaced subsistence farmers 
converted into agricultural wage laborers, first in coffee then later in cotton, 
have become a revolutionary rural proletariat driven by the fires of desperation. 
How long the Guatemalan oligarchy stands is a matter of debate but it is clear 
that El Salvador would fall tomorrow without United States military aid. By 
surrendering seignorial control over its labor force, the Salvadoran elite gained 
economic power but may have lost its life as a political entity. Finally, in 
Costa Rica, the coffee elite found to its great amazement that it had been pushed 
form.politica1 power by a revolution which it had originally backed in the hope 
of protecting its economic and political position. Its weakness in 'the face of 
the challenges of the 1948 revolution and the rising Costa Rican middle and 
working classes may have come as a shock to a class which had been ruling the 
country without interruption since the rise of the coffee export economy in the 
mid-nineteenth century. But it is not surprising considering the limited 
economic and political resources on which its power ~ested. In Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, coffee has.shaped history for more than a 
century. It has also, in, fundamental ways, shaped the political challenges of 
the present and the political possibilities of the future. 
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Table 1. Coffee Area and Product ion f o r  Costa Rica (1955), Nicaragua (1957-58), E l  ~ a l v a d o r  (1940, 1957-58) 
and Guatemala (1966-67) by Class  P o s i t i o n  of Producers .  
Coffee Area i n  Manza'nas 
Farm COSTA RICA 1955 NICARAGUA 1957-58 EL SALVADOR 1940 GUATEMALA 1966-67 
C la s s  Area 
P o s i t i o n  i n  No. % T o t a l  No. % T o t a l  No. % T o t a l  No. % T o t a l  
Coffee Farms Area ' Farms Area Farms Area Farms Area 
Sub-Family 0--4.9 19,049 5 9 7 6 2  11.4)24.5 9,768 25- 
Family 5--9.9 1,775 14.2 33*6} 47*8  2,059 13 .1  --- ----} 11 ,6  } l8 30,000 ---- 
Small Emp. 10-49.9 979 22.1 1,256 22.6 ' 1,322 27.4 606 4.6 
E s t a t e  50-99.9 
I n t .  Prod. loo+ 212 19 2 lo' 2i:z} 30.6 . 83 314 ::::} 52.8 i:::) 83.7 636 
T o t a l s  21,987 100.1 9,603 99.9 11,545 100.0 ------ 99.9 
T o t a l  Area 80,574 123,253 117,216 (1940) 330,900 (1964) 
N 
178,070 (1957-58) 
Coffee Product ion  i n  Qu in t a l e s  of Green Coffee 
Farm COSTA R I C A  1955 NICARAGUA 1957-58 EL SALVADOR 1957-58 GUATEMALA 1966-67 
C la s s  Area 
P o s i t i o n  i n  ' % Nat iona l  % Nat iona l  % Nat iona l  % Nat iona l  
c o f f e e  ' Product ion  Product ion  Product ion  Production 
Sub-Family 0--4.9 7.4 ----},13.5 --- 
Fami l y  5--9.9 ---- ----} - - 1 3 . 1  
Small  Emp. 10-49.9 5.9 20.3 3.9 22.9 10.7 28.4 12.8 7.3 
E s t a t e  50-99.9 
I n t .  Prod. loo+ 8.2 - 4.9 - 12*5 i:::} 58.1 - 4 * 3  i!j:;}64.2 1.9 - "." 7.6 ::}79.5 
To ta 1s X06.5. 100.1 X03.9 99.9 Xu10.6 100.0 X-6.6 99.9 
T o t a l  Prod. 522,998 474,683 1,891,201 2,188,517(1964) 
- . - . . ..--- 
Sources: Costa Rica: Costa Rica.  ~ i r e c c i g n  General  de E s t a d f s t i c a  y Cen 1 o s ,  1957 : 101,230. Nicaragua: Nicaragua. 
~ i r e c c i 6 n  General  de ES t a d f s  t i c a  y Censos, 1961 : 7. Salvador:  Asociacion Caf e t a l e r a  de  E l  Salvador ,  1940 : 26 ; 
E l  Salvador .  ~ i r e c c i o ' n  General  de  ~ s t a d G t i c a  y Censos, 1961: 51. Guatemala: B iech le r ,  1970: 109; Guatemala. 
~ f r e c c i g n  General  de  E s t a d f s t i c a ;  1953: 5; 1971: 245,248. 
Table 2. D i s t r i b u t i o n  of Product ion by C la s s  P o s i t i o n  of Producers  f o r  
Nicaragua i n  1910 and 1957. 
REGIONS I I ~ ~ I V  
Prod. 
MANAGUA CARAZ 0 
C la s s  
P o s i t i o n  QQ 
19 10 19 57 19 10 19 57 
Sub-Fami l y  10 
Family . 10<40 
s3} 1 . 2  
.9 




Small  Emp. .40<200 11.3 7 . 1  21.4 15 .O 
E s t a t e  20C<500 
I n t .  Prod. ~ 5 0 0  54.3 
22'51 80.8 21*1} 91.6 2 ; : ; )  74.8 5 8 . 3 ~  33*9} 88.2 70.5. 
T o t a l  %, 99.9 99 .S 99.9 100.1: :.: 
T o t a l  Prod. 67,440 81,004 47,187 119,087 
% Nation 38.8% 17.1% 27 .l% 25 .l% 
- ~ ~ 
REGION V I  
. . MAT AG ALPA JINOTEGA 
Class-  '; . :.:. Prod. 
QQ ~ o s i c i o n : '  19 10 1957 19 10 1957 
. - 
~ u b - ~ a m i l ~  10 
Family 10<40 
1*1} 4.2 
3 . 1  
} 1 1  3 * 5  
9.9. 
5'3} 19.4 
.3} 3'8 14.1 
Small E ~ D .  40<200 .: .19.2 30.9 18.8 23.5 . 
E s t a t e  - 200b500 3 3 . 1 1  76.6 
I n t .  Prod. .%5 0 0 43.5 
24.7)  57.4 32.7. 
21*3) 57.1 
-, 
24.7} 32.  77.4 - 35.8, -. 
T o t a l  % 100 .O 100.0 100 .O 100.0 
T o t a l  Prod. 
% Nation 
REGION I 
ESTELI NUEVA SEGOVIA 
Clas s  Prod. 
P o s i t i o n  . . QQ 
19 10 1957 19 10 1957 
Sub- Fami l y  . 10 
Fami l y  .10<40 
9.4} 30.9 14'7} 48.6 21.5 18.1} 58.8 33.9 5 '7}  16.8 40.7 11.1 
 ma 11- Emp . 40<200 48.0 11.6 40.7 64.5 
E s t a t e  200<500 35.2) 35.2 29.6} 29.6 10.8 4'6} 4.6 
I n t  . Prod. g500 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
T o t a l  % 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0 
T o t a l  Prod. 2,341 4,476 2,322 15,535 
% Nation 1.3% .9% 1.3% 3.3% 
Source: ~ e & b l i c a  de  Nicaragua, ' 1910 ( c a l c u l a t e d  from census l i s t i n g )  ; 
Nicaragua. E ~ t a d f ~ t , & c ~ e y . e ~ e ~ s d s ,  E$9.6dL3rica y % ! ~ s s s ,  Iof;l: .. - 7 .  
T a b l e  3. Mean Area and Mean P r o d u c t i o n  of E s t a t e s  w i t h  100 Manzanas o r  More 
P l a n t e d  i n  Coffee ,  and T o t a l  Area and T o t a l  P roduc t ion  of E s t a t e s  
w i t h  50 Manzanas o r  More P l a n t e d  i n  Cof fee  by Country.  
- - 
E s t a t e  Area i n  Cof fee  
1100 Mz 250 Mz 
Country 
Mean Mean T o t a l  T o t a l  
Area Prod.  Area Prod.  
(Mz) (QQ) (1000 Mz) (1000 QQ) 
COSTA RICA 2 10 1722 24.7 196.1 
NICARAGUA 19 5 955 6 5 . 1  304.8 
EL SALVADOR 228 2713 95.6 1098.8 
GUATEMALA 342 2479 202.1 1278.3 
. . 
Source:  T a b l e  1. Guatemala area-.and p r o d u c t i o n  d a t a  based  >on. a y e r a g e  of 1950 -- - 
1964 c e n s u s  f i g u r e s .  * 
T a b l e  4 .  Number of Smal l  Holders  and Number of R e s i d e n t  and Non-Resident 
Workers Employed on E s t a t e s  w i t h  More t h a n  50 Manzanas i n  Cof fee  
i n  E l  Sa lvador ,  ( l 9 4 0 ) ,  Guatemala (1942-43) and Costa  Rica  (1935) .  
Category SALVADOR GUATEMALA ~a tegd:y COSTA RICA 
Smal l  Holders  
R e s i d e n t  Adul t  
Males 
Harves t  Migran t  
( A l l  workers )  
T o t a l  Harves t  
Labor 
E s t a t e  Area 
(1000 Mz) 
E s t a t e  Prod.  
(1000 QQ) 
9 ,  J68 9 ,340 Smal l  Holders  
27,396 76,767 Permanent Workers 
231,710 142 ,941  Harves t  Migrant  
T A l l  Workers) 
310,000 350,000 T o t a l  Harves t  
Labor 
62.9 164.5  E s t a t e  Area 
(1000 Mz) 
784.4 895.2 E s t a t e  Prod.  
(1000 QQ) 
/ 
Sources :  E l  Sa lvador :  Asociacion~Ca~.etalera-derEl Salvador ,  1940:26,34,35,  
39.  Guatemala: Guatemala, O f i c i n a  C e n t r a l  d e l  ~ a f d ,  1946:87, 99,  109,213; , 
B i e c h l e r ,  1970:264. Costa  Rica:  Cos ta  Rica ,  I n s t i t u t o  d e  Defensa d e l  Cafe 
d e  Costa  Rica ,  1935:58,59. 
Tab le  5. D i s t r i b u t i o n  of Arabica V a r i e t i e s ,  F e r t i l i z e r  Use and Dens i ty  of 
P l a n t i n g s  by Country 1950-57. 
Techn ica l  COSTA R I C A  NICARAGUA SALVADOR GUATEMALA 
. Index  1955 , 1957 1957 19 50 
Typica 
Maragogipe 67.9} 67.9 ---- 80.1} 4.3 84.4 ---- 29*3} 29.3 48.5} 5 0 53.5 
Typica-Bourbon ---- ---- ---- 32.1 
Bourbon 
Othe r s  
T o t a l  
--  
F e r t i l i z e r  Use % T o t a l  Coffee Area 
Organic  
Chemi c a  1 
None 
T o t a l  
- -- 
Number of Trees/Mz 
- .  Densi ty  ---- 1,000 1,258 635 
Sources:  Costa  Rica: E s t a d i s t i c a  y Censos, 1957: 40,42,44,233. Nicaragua: 
~ s t a d f s t i c a  y Censos, '1961: 11,13,18. E l  Sa lvador :  E s t a d f s t i c a  y Censos, 1961: 
3-5. Guatemala: E s t a d f s t i c a ,  1963:7,37,71. 
Table  6. Yie lds  i n  ~ u i n t a l e s  of Green Coffee p e r  Manzana f o r  Se l ec t ed  
Pe r iods  b y  Country. 
Pe r iod  COSTA R I C A  NICARAGUA SALVADOR GUATEMALA 
1942 0.r b e f o r e  7.6 (1935) 6 . 1  (1910) 11.1 (1940) ' 6..3 (1942-43) 
1948-1952 ' 6.9 5 .3  10.1 5.4 
1961-1965 9 . 1  5.2 12.4 8 .O 
1969-1971 13.2 6.9 17.1 8 . 3  
1978 17.8 9.2 16.7 9.7 
1980 21.2 9 .0  14.7 9 .5  
--- -- 
Sources:  United Nat ions Food and A g r i c u l t u r e  Organiza t ion ,  1981:184;1960:129. 
Costa  Rica (1935) : I n s t i t u t o  de Defensa,  1935: 59. Costa Rica (1961-1965) : 
/ 
~ s t a d f s t i c a  y Censos, 1965: 151. Nicaragua (1910) : Republica de  Nicaragua,  1910: 
644. Nicaragua (1961-1980) : Gar iazzo  e t  a l . ,  1983: Appendix Table  7.  Sa lvador  
(1940) : ~ s o c i a c i d n  Caf e t a l e r a ,  1940: 26. Gu temala (1942-43) : Of i c i n a  C e n t r a l ,  ! 1946:152,194. Guatemala (1961-1965): Estad s t i c a ,  1971:245,248. 
T a b l e  7. E s t i m a t e s  of t h e  Technolog ica l  O r g a n i z a t i o n  of C e n t r a l  American Cof fee  P r o d u c t i o n  by Juan  Pablo  
Duque f o r  t h e  Colombian Coffee  Board, June  1937. 
Harves t ing  
Pruning 
F e r t i l i z e r  
T r a n s p o r t  
Ptbc'ei3Sing 
Makhinery 
COSTA R I C A  N I  CARAG UA EL SALVADOR GUATEMALA 
mature  beans  on ly  s t r i p p i n g  r i p e  and mature  beans  on ly  mature  beans  on ly  
u n r i p e  beans ,  l e a v e s  
i n t e n s e  f r e e  growth 
I fg rea t  p reoccupa t ion  None 
w i t h  s p r e a d i n g  t h e  
u s e  of chemica l  f e r -  
t i l i z e r s "  
i n t e n s e  b u t  
v a r i a b l e  
g r e e  growth 
a  c, 
I z o t e  (yucca s p . )  genera-lluseo 
and)-inineral  -.'L - IC 
o x c a r t s ,  . t r u c k s  t r u c k s  (Carazo) c a r t s ,  t r u c k s  c a r t s ,  t r u c k s ,  pack 
Pack an imals  (Mata- an imals ,  human b e a r e r s  
ga lpa-J ino tega)  
imported,  s o p h i s t i =  l o c a l ,  p r i m i t i v e  imported,  s o p h i s t i -  i m p o r t e d , s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
c a t e d .  " c o n s t a n t  pre- c a t e d .  S i m i l a r  t o  ( b u t  l a g s  behind'  CR 
occupa t ion  w i t h  improv- Costa Rica  and;,SAE)Z:. , .. i , j  
i n g  p r o c e s s i n g  p l a n t "  
Q u a l i t y  20 h i g h  
C o n t r o l  
Machine Yes 
Dry ing  
non-ex i s ten t  h i g h  h i g h  
Source:  Duque, 1938. 
a. Dominguez (19701167)~reports;that~fertilizen u s e  wasZaonfiineduto,Cerp5n p l a n t e r s  and t h a t  " i n o r g a n i c  
f e r t i l i z e r s  were ,~bnoad l j r~ :  s p e a k i n g , o u t  o f ' r e a c h  of a l l  b u t  t h e  most p rosperous  of t h e  p l a n t e r s . "  Data 
from t h e  1950 census  r e p o r t e d  i n  Tab le  4 above show t h a t  no f e r t i l i z e r  was used on a lmos t  n i n e t y  p e r c e n t  
of t h e  c o f f e e  a r e a .  
Table 8 ,  Number of Coffee Processing p l a n t s  (bene f i c io s )  f o r  Se lec ted  Per iods  
by Country. 
-- 
COSTA R I C A  EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA . GUATEMALA 
Per iod  
Number of benef i c i o s  
Sources: Costa Rica: St$iie,11982:256; I n s t i t u t o  de Defensa, 1935:59; Se l igson ,  
1975:24. Nicara ua:  Republica de  Nicaragua, 1910 ( c a l c u l a t e d  from census 9 l i s t i n g )  ; E s t a d l s t i c a  y  Censos, 1961: 25. E l  Salvador:  A ' s o c i a ~ ~ b n  Cafetalera ' ,  
1940 :l83-191 ( c a l c u l a t e d  from l is  t ingcof  -bene f i c io s~ )  ; Cas tenada, ,-197-7 : n. p  . . - 
Guatemela: _Of j c i n a  c e n t r a l ,  1946 :-146; ~ s t a d f s t i c a ,  1953: 80. . 
a .  Data f o r  farms producing 200 QQ o r  more of c o f f e e  b e r r i e s  i n  Guatemala 
only .  For comparative purposes t he  Nicaragua t o t a l  i nc ludes  only farms 
producing 40 QQ of green c o f f e e  o r  more ( 5 QQ of b e r r i e s  y i e l d s  approximately 
1 QQ of green  c o f f e e ) .  
Table 9  .. Number of Coffee Processing P l a n t s  ' ( b e n e f i c i o s )  and Number of 
Legal Export Trademarks Held by La rges t  Holders i n  E l  Salvador 
i n  1940. 
. . - r,i 
~ d l d e r s  -of Larges t  No. of 
Benef i c i o s  
Number of 
Family o r  Co. Ben. Exp. 
Holders of ~ a r ~ e s t  No. of 
Export Brands 
Number of 




So l  M i l l e t  
Gui ro la  
de Sola 
/ S a l a v e r r l a  
Alf a r o  
Caceres 
Boni l l a  
Regalado 
Alvafez 
~ a ~ a % a  
Duenas 
Lima 
Meardi 60 12 
Alvareli 2  2  4  
C u r a ~ a o  Trading 19 1 
de  Sola 18 6  
Dag li o 17 8  
J .  H i l l  16 1 
Gold t ree-Liebes 9  2  
Delpech 8  1 
Meza Ayau 7  1 
Nottlebohm Trading 7  2  
~ u e g a s  6  4  
Gu i ro l a  6  7  
~ b r i f n  . : 6 1 
Ma tamoros 6  1 
Regalado 
/ 
. 6 4 
S a l a v e r r l a  6 5  
 ides 6 1 
Source: Asocizcidn Cafe t a l e r a ,  1940 : 133-199. 
T a b l e  10.  P r i n c i p a l  P roducers  i n  t h e  Department of Carazo i n  1910. 
Area Prod.  ' ~ o t a l  T o t a l  No. 
(Mz.) (QQ) Area Prod. Ben. 
P roducer  E s t a t e s  , -  
ARTURO VAUGHAM 
JOSE E GONZALEZ 
San F r a n c i s c o  
La P r o v i d e n c i a  
Monte C r i s t o  
La Palmera 
ADOLFO BENARD San D i o n i s i o  
S a n t a  Rosa 
San F r a n c i s c o  
E l  P a r a i s o  
E l  Pochoton 
La Moca 
FERNANDO CHAMORRO La ~ m i s  t a d
E l  B r a s i l  
TEODORO TEFEL 
VINCENTE RODRIQUEZ 
Chi lama t a  1 
S a n t a  C e c i l i a  
San Ramiro 
JOSE IG. GONZALEZ San J o r g e  
Las D e l i c i a s  
IGNACIO BALTODANO. 
JOSE M .  SIERO 
E l  B r a s i l i t o  180 
S a n t a  G e r t r u d i s  56 
Andalucia  9 0 
ANASTASIO SOMOZA S a n t a  J u l i a  5 
E l  Convoy 1 4  
E l  P o r v e n i r  7 5 
Source:  ~ e ~ g b l i c a  d e  Nicaragua,  1910: 666-671. Based on Census l i s t i n g  
of a l l  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o d u c e r s  f o r  Carazo i n  1910. 
Table 11. Coffee and E l i t e  S t r u c t u r e  i n  Nicaragua, Guatemala and E l  Salvador.  
NICARAGUA GUATEMALA EL SALVADOR 
Family Coffee Family Coffee Family Coffee 
Wea 1 t h  Wealth Wealth 
Alvarez 




~ e r n i n d e z  Hollman 
Frawley 






Osorio P e t e r s  
P e l l a s  Chamorro 
P e r e i r a  
Reyes C a ~ d e n a l  
Reyes Montealegre 
Sacasa Guerrero 
~ e r a / n  
V i l l a  
Abularch 
X Ale j o s  
X Arenales  
Ay cinena 
Bouscayrol 




X Granai  





S i n i b a l d i  
Skinner  Klee 




Ba ta r se  









Gadala ~ a r f a  
Goldtree-Liebes 
Gui ro la  
Hasbun 
H i l l  





~ u i h n e z  
Regalado 
Saf i e  
Schwartz 
~ i m l n  
Sol  M i l l e t  
Vairo 
Wright 
Zab l a h  
Sources: NZeatagka: Wheelock, 1978:188. Guatemala: Jonas and Tobis,  1974:216-251. 
E l  Salvador: Aubey, 1968-69:272-276. Coffee weal th  based on t h e s e  sources and 
~ e ~ : b l i c a  de Nicaragua, 1910; Col indres ,  1976: 471, and ~ s o c i a c i 6 n  Caf e t a l e r a ,  
1940 : 183-199. 
F i g u r e  1. Bases of Power by S t a g e  of t h e  P r o d u c t i o n  P r o c e s s  f o r  t h e  
Coffee  E l i t e s  of Guatemala, E l  ~ a l v a d o r ,  Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua c a .  1940. 
-- 
- GUATEMALA EL SALVADOR COSTA R I C A  NICARAGUA - -. 
LAND X 
PRODUCTION X 
PROCESSING X X 
EXPORT X X 0 
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